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3I . Introduction
A. The general Problem
At the end of World War II. the non-scheduled air
carrier emerged as an important factor in the field of air
transportation. Previous to the war, the non-scheduled air
carrier had been subject to a minimum of regulation by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Little information as to the number
or characteristics was available. Since the war, the non-
scheduled air carrier has assumed increasing importance in
the air transportation field. The rapid growth of the non-
certificated cargo carrier has shown a need for more inform-
ation on this new phase of air transportation. In this
thesis, the writer will examine the non-scheduled air car-
rier or, as he is designated by the Civil .eronautics Board,
the non-certif icated cargo carrier. He will describe the
number of air cargo operators, the evolution of non-sched-
uled air cargo regulation, the rate structure of the cargo
carrier, the problems facing the air freight operator, and
the future place of the air freight operator in the national
transportation picture.
The statistical data pertaining to the non-scheduled
._
.
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4carrier is sketchy and incomplete. Various federal agen-
cies disagree upon the number of operators v/ith the esti-
mates ranging between two and four thousand. However the
number of cargo carriers who dominate the air freight field
is small. About fifteen percent of the cargo carriers con-
trol over ninety percent of the air freight business. (1)
Air freight is controlled largely by the non-cert ificated
cargo carrier. The regular (certificated) air lines hold
only a minor share of the total volume. This study will
endeavor to draw some conclusions as to the future of air
freight and to the problems of its growth.
B. Air Cargo Defined
The term "air cargo” has been subject to a con-
tinually narrowing definition. Then the term air cargo was
first used, it covered all the categories of goods that were
carried in the aircraft. As each category of goods became
a separate classification of air transportation, the gen-
eral term ”air cargo” served to cover a progressively small-
er amount of traffic. :,Vhen the Kelley Act of 1926 (2) was
passed, air mail became a separate classification, one that
dominated the air transportation field for almost a decade.
1. The Development, Operation, and Regulation of the Non-
Scheduled Air Carrier, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington,
D. C. 1947, pi
2. Frovided that private organizations might carry air
mail under government contract.
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5Later the field of air express was formed out of air cargo.
This classification of air express included packages and
small crates shipped by air and carried as part of a mixed
load. (1) Many of the items that moved by air express were
later to form the basis of the present category of air freight.
Air freight did not become a separate branch of
air transportation until World War II. It developed as a re-
sult of the requirements of the armed services during the
war. In 1944, American Airlines created a department in its
organization for the handling of air freight. This depart-
ment was to handle large volume movement of materials by
air rather than small shipments of packages and boxes as had
been the case insofar as air express was concerned. As a
result of this action by American Airlines, air freight was
recognized by the shipping industry as bulk items and mate-
rials having a lower priority than air mail or express.
The carriage of air freight may be termed the movement of
bulk items by air.
C. Cargo Carriers Defined
As the term air cargo has developed, so has the
definition of a cargo carrier. Until the Kelley Act of
1926, there were few aircraft operators who offered more
than charter service. Under the Kelley Act and until the
1. Air express was handled by Air Express, a subsidiary of
the Railway Express Agency.
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6McNary-V/atres Act of 1930, the operators of the scheduled
services were mainly carriers of air mail and of such air
express as might he solicited. With the passage of the
l.'cITary-Watres Act of 1930, the Postmaster General of the
United States was empowered to make contracts for the car-
riage of air mail on a space basis. The act further pro-
vided, "that the- postmaster General might extend or consol-
idate routes when in his judgement the public interest will
be promoted thereby." (1) as a result of the energetic en-
forcement of the Mcnary-Watres Act of 1930 by the Postmaster-
General, the airlines holding contracts for the transporta-
tion of air mail became interested in the carriage of pas-
sengers inasmuch as it was to tneir beueno uo operate larger
planes
.
During the war, the airlines which had contracts
with the armed forces were engaged almost exclusively in
the transportation of passengers throughout the world, while
the handling of air cargo was left in the hand of strictly
military groups, .it the end of the war, the certificated
airlines had learned comparatively little concerning the
management of air freight. On the other hand, servicemen
who had participated in the military end of carge handling
and had become skilled in that phase of air transportation
started many new lines. Some of these lines were Willis Air-
1. U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol XLYI Part I, Chapter £23.
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freight, the Flying Tiger Lins, California Eastern Air-
lines, U. 3. Airlines, Flamingo Airlines, Keteor Airlines,
and Slick Airways.
Before, during and until the end of World War II,
there were two classifications of aircraft operators in
commercial service. These classifications were set up by
4
the Civil Aeronautics Authority at its organization in
1938 and were continued by the Civil Aeronautics Board
when it took over control of civil aviation in 1940. One
was the scheduled operators who operated over specific
routes at scheduled times and who were issued certificates
of public necessity and convenience by the Civil Aeronautics
Board in order to operate. The second classification in-
cluded the non-scheduled operators who had few restrictions
applied to them. The scheduled operators holding certifi-
cates of public necessity and convenience held the air mail
contracts, carried all of the passengers traveling by sched-
uled air transportation in the United States and were
strictly regulated both as to safety and economic (finance,
accounting, rates etc.) condition. The non-scheduled (non-
certificated ) operators were regulated only in regard to
flight conditions and as to general flight rules. No effort
was made by the Civil Aeronautics Board to regulate their
finances, rates etc., thus the non-scheduled operators were
able to enter and leave the air transportation field 'with
ease. This ease of entrance and withdrawal from the field
«'
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caused a wide variance in the number of non-scheduled
operators
.
During 1946, the number of non-scheduled opera-
tors increased rapidly as a result of many factors includ-
ing the surplus planes available through the disposal pro-
gram of the government, the reserve of trained pilots re-
leased by the Army and Navy, the inability of the scheduled
airlines to handle all persons desiring air transportation,
and the disinterest of the scheduled airlines in air freight
as a revenue producer. The Department of Commerce states,
"Almost entirely a postwar development in commercial air
transportation, the non-scheduled air carrier enjoyed a
phenomenal growth during 1946." (1) On August 1, 1946,
all non-scheduled air carriers were brought more fully under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board. More com-
prehensive safety and economic regulations were found to be
justified and were placed in force. In January, 1947, ad-
ditional regulations pertaining to aircraft operation and
maintainance of the non-scheduled operators were issued by
the Civil Aeronautics Board.
During the period from 1938 when the Civil Aeronau
tics Authority was organized, until May, 1947, all non sched
1. The Development, Operation, and Regulation of the Non-
Scheduled Air Carrier, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington,
D. C. 1947, p.l
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9uled air carriers were considered as being in the same cat-
egory in spite of the fact that some of the lines handled
only passengers, some only freight, and some combined the
two. On Hay 8, 1947, after a long investigation including
hearings for all interested parties, the Civil Aeronautics
Board issued new regulations that separated the non-sched-
uled air carriers into two new categories: \l; non-certifi-
cated air cargo carriers and ^2) non-certificated irregular
air carriers. By these regulations, the field of air cargo
was recognized as a distinct branch of air transportation.
The cargo carriers were described as ’’engaged in the inter-
state or overseas air transportation of property only on a
regular or irregular basis without the need of holding a
certificate of public convenience and necessity." (1)
The passage of these regulations was gratifying
to the cargo carriers inasmuch as it enabled them to be-
gin operations on a regular schedule. They could compete
much more advantageously with the scheduled air carriers
who had begun to invade the air cargo field in earnest
during the first part of 1947. This invasion began after
the independent air cargo carriers had built a system that
moved over thirty million ton-miles of freight in the first
1. The Development, Operation, and Regulation of the Fon-
Scheduled Air Carrier, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington,
D . C • p . 4
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year of operation while the old established carriers moved
less than half that volume. (1)
D. Problems Involved
As this thesis was being written, the scheduled
airlines were making a determined effort to capture the
air freight field by various methods, some by the request
to the Civil Aeronautics Board for restrictive regulation
against the non-certificated air cargo carrier and some by
economic means. The scheduled air carriers wrere attempt-
ing to eliminate the freight forwarders completely from
the field of air transportation. (2) The scheduled air
carriers were pushing with all possible speed, the virtues
of Air Cargo Inc., their mutually owned subsidiary for the
handling of air cargo. The independent air carriers claimed
that Air Cargo Inc. was a monopoly and should be broken up
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. At the same time, the Air
Express- Division of the Railway Express Agency was fighting
to keep its place in the picture of air cargo while in
danger of being eliminated both by the regulation of the
Civil Aeronautics Board and by the competition of the sched-
1.
The Development, Operation, and Regulation of the Non-
Scheduled Air Carrier, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington,
D . C . p . 9
2. The freight forwarders are a necessary adjunct of the
cargo carriers who depend on the forwarders to furnish a
ground organization which the cargo carriers can not finance
independently
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uled air carriers’ own subsidiary. The cargo carriers
were fighting to maintain their superiority in the freight
field. The freight forwarders were petitioning the Civil
Aeronautics Board to be given a recognized place in the
air freight field with the support of the cargo carriers
and were being opposed by the Air Transport Association
composed of the scheduled air carriers. The rivalry and
in-fighting between various segments of the air trans-
portation industry is best shown by the following release
concerning a "harmony" dinner held by the Aviation Writers
Association of New York during January, 1948.
"Councillor Goodkind (CA3) stressed the
Civil Aeronautics Board’s role of promoting
commercial air services without going in
for unnecessary regulation and restriction.
As the government representative, he smiled
impartially at later verbal exchanges fired
from all sides. Emery Johnson (of Air Cargo
Inc.) described the progress of Air Cargo
Inc. as a ground service subsidiary of the
certificated air carriers. Counsel Wil-
son for Railway Express Agency which feels
that it is slowly being forced out of the
pickup and delivery field for air, derided
the purpose, progress, and even questioned
the need for Air Cargo Inc. He repeated Rail-
way Express Agenc 3r ’s claims that it should be
permitted by the Civil Aeronautics Board to
handle consolidation for all types of carriers.
When Honey of California Eastern spoke, gloves
were really off and no punches pulled. He
accused the certificated airlines of trying to
run the independents out of the cargo field.
’How’, he asked, ’can the scheduled air lines
with direct flying costs reported to the Civil
Aeronautics Board of more than nineteen cents
per ton-mile, quote eleven, twelve, and thir-
teen cents per ton-mile to carry air freight?’
.•
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Johnson of Air Cargo Inc. who found him-
self of the role of the only defender of
the ’certs’ with a voice at the head table
replied that the high costs cited by Honey
were overall costs in which passenger trans-
ports are larger in number than cargo craft.
But Honey accused the ’certs' of planning to
use increased mail subsidies to offset freight
losses and cited United’s recent request for
$2.26 per ton-mile on mail, more than five
times the present rate. Stressing that Air-
freight Association members had reported their
costs for freight, he said that it was up to
the ’certs* to provide the same specific all-
cargo figures for comparison.
John B. Emery of Emery Air Freight represent-
ing freight forwarders, urged early approval
of freight forwarders for air, and said that
it was his opinion that even present surface
forwarders should be approved. ’Air freight,’
he said, ’is growing big enough for everyone
to get in on it and the more groups generating
business, the faster air freight will grow.’” (1)
The above release gives some picture of the confu-
sion existing in the field of air freight at the present
time, the various conflicting interests involved, and the
problems that complicate the future of air freight and the
agencies that will handle it.
3. History of ^.ir Cargo
From the time that the airplane first emerged as
a practical instrument of transportation, pioneers in the
air transportation industry have had visions of it comple-
menting and even supplanting the railroad freight car as the
1. Cargo Squawks ^ired
,
Air Transport, McGraw-Hill Publish-
ing Co., New York, February, 1948
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principal means by which freight was moved. However, while
the air passenger, the air mail, and the air express divi-
sions of air transportation grew and prospered, there had
been no development of air freight prior to World War II.
The impetus was given to the growth of air freight by the
Army during the national defense period before the United
States entered the war . At that time, the government made
a contract with Pan-American Airways obligating Pan Ameri-
can to lay out and operate a route for air travel from
Miami down the coast of South America to Natal, Brazil,
then across the Atlantic to Accra and Bathurst, then
through Africa to Egypt. Pan-American operated the planes
and fields along this route for the carriage of passenger
and cargo. The route was used extensively in the first
phase of the African Campaign to rush supplies to Mont-
gomery at Tobruk and supplies brought over this route
were instrumental at one time in saving all the U. 3. tanks
operating with the British Source. (1) From this first
contract with Pan-American Airways and later contracts with
Eastern Airlines, Northeast Airlines, American Airlines, and
others, was developed the Ferry Service which later was re-
named the A ir Transport Command.
During the war, the Air Transport Command, with its
1. Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army 1941
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naval counterpart, the Naval Air Transport Service, led in
the development of the transportation of air cargo. Through
its military requirements, it furthered methods of handling
cargo, both on the ground and in the air. In addition, it
trained men in the handling of aircraft and in the handling
of cargo, two prime factors in the later growth of commer-
cial air freight. While the scheduled airlines gained a
great deal of knowledge and were able to expand their facil-
ities manyfold for the prosecution of the war
,
they were un-
able to expand their commercial services and, in many in-
stances, were forced to contract them.
The scheduled airlines made few betterments during
the war and there was little new activity in civilian avia-
tion. Perhaps the single new development occured in 1944
when American Airlines announced that it was setting up a
separate division for the handling of air freight as a re-
sult of its experiences during the war. This ^as the first
time that air freight was recognized as a separate branch
of air transportation and was the first step taken in the
commercial air freight field. However, because of the short-
age of personnel and equipment, and because of the demands
made upon the airline by the war effort, American Airlines
made little effort to push the development of the air freight
field
.
At the conclusion of hostilities a year after this
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action by American airlines, no effort had been made to ex-
ploit the field and American Airlines was the only system
that had so much as an announced plan to enter the air freight
field. At the end of hostilities, other scheduled airlines
set up air freight division and made plans to develop the
business. However, passenger traffic expanded greatly and
the scheduled airlines gave that phase of air transportation
first call on their services. ’Alien returning air force
personnel and equipment became surplus at the beginning of
1946, commercial air freight was still a virgin field wait-
ing to be developed. American Airlines had studied the air
freight possibilities and had made grants to several universi-
ties to study potentialities and difficulties involved. Re-
turning veterans, especially those of the Air Transport Com-
mand and the Naval Air Transport Service, had practical ex-
perience in the handling and shipment of air cargo. Conse-
quently, in the first part of 1946, veterans banding together
to form the so-called independents, were able to gain and
hold a major portion of the air cargo field v/hile the regular
(scheduled) airlines were concentrating upon regaining their
pre-war passenger traffic. The non-scheduled freight oper-
ators had no competition from the certificated airlines during
1946 and were able to concentrate on the development of the
air freight field while the scheduled airlines were fighting
off the efforts of other non-scheduled operators to cut into
..
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the passenger field, a field which the scheduled airlines
had regarded as their own.
At the hegining of 1947, the scheduled Airline
Industry had beaten off the competition for its passenger
business and so turned its attention to the capture of the
air freight field from the non-scheduled cargo carriers who
were controlling the field. However, the non-scheduled
operators in the air cargo field were better entrenched,
financially more stable, and much more experienced than had
been the non-scheduled operators who had attempted to enter
the passenger field. The scheduled airlines have had much
more trouble trying to capture the air freight field than
they did in maintaining control of the passenger field.
During this period, the Civil Aeronautics Board
made no attempt to regulate the air cargo field other than
tightening up the flying and maintenance regulations of the
non-cert ificated aircraft operators. It began an investi-
gation on which to base new regulation of the non-scheduled
aircraft industry, but at the beginning of 1947, had published
no new regulations. These various forces in the air freight
field set the stage for a series of developments in 1947.
-,
t
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II The Air Freight Agencies
A. Number
During 1947, no agency, public or private, icne
w
the exact number of non-scheduled air carriers operating
in the United States. On January 27, 1947, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration estimated tnat there were *ap-
proximately 3585 non-scnedu±ed air earner operators m
tne united States’*. ^l; Nine months later, a more ac-
curate count showed that there were 1998 operators with
4439 planes and 8488 pilots. (2) In addition, permits
were being issued at the rate of two hundred a month with
an expected total of three thousand. However, the return
of 871 questionnaires to the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion by non-scheduled operators on December 31, 1946,
showed that only nineteen out of the 871 operators report-
ing were engaged exclusively in the movement of air freight
These nineteen, however, carried the bulk of all cargo
handled by both the scheduled and the non-scheduled car-
riers. Of these nineteen lines, in 1946, eight lines car-
ried 93$ of the air cargo handled by tne independents and
62$ of all cargo carried by both the scheduled and the non-
1. The Development, Operation, and Regulation of the Non-
Scheduled Air Carrier, U. 3. Dept, of Commerce, Washington,
D. C., 1947, p .6
2. CiiA Bulletin, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
October 10, 1947
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scheduled carriers. (1)
The number of non-scheduled carriers dropped off
sharply during 1947 due to a great variety of factors,
chief among which was the uncertainty as to the future legal
status of the non-scheduled carriers. This was due to in-
decision on the part of the Civil Aeronautics Board as to
whether the non-scheduled operators should be granted a
position in civil aviation and to determined opposition by
the scheduled airlines before the Civil Aeronautics Board
in regard to certification of the non-scheduled operators.
Other factors that served to curtail the number of non-
scheduled operators were difficulties in soliciting traf-
fic due to lack of organization, increasing operating costs,
maintenance problems, competition among non-cert lficated
operators, and increasing competition from scheduled air
carriers as they began to make strong efforts to dominate
the air cargo field, and finally, the inability of the
non-scheduled operators to obtain return loads and thus
insure maximum use of their equipment.
B. Fiscal Results -1946
During the year 1946, both the certificated and
the non-certificated air carriers showed net operating losses
as a group. However, while individual lines in the certifi-
1. Estimated-Aviation V/eek, McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., N.Y.,
February 3, 1947
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cated group did show a net operating profit, no single
line in the non-certificated group was able to show earn-
ings. It was not until September, 1947, that Slick Air-
ways, largest freight carrier of both groups, but a non-
certificated carrier, showed a profit for the month of
September, 1947, and at the end of 1947, was the only non-
certificated air carrier to be operating at a profit. (1)
C. Tonnage
The Department of Commerce of the United States
estimated that the non-scheduled airlines flew; about
47,000,000 ton-miles in 1947. This estimate was based on
an air cargo survey conducted by the Department of Commerce
for the last six months of 1946 on the basis of statistics
submitted by the non-certificated cargo carriers to the
Civil Aeronautics Board. This tonnage was about three times
the volume of freight traffic of the certificated carriers
and was greater than the certificated airlines* express and
freight combined. (2)
At the end of October, 1947, twelve airlines held
control of the entire air freight field. Of these, seven
were non-certificated cargo carriers and five were the regu-
lar scheduled air carriers. That the non-certificated cargo
carriers held the lead in the battle for the development and
1. News Digest, Aviation Week, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.,
N. Y., November 17, 1947
2. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air
Cargo Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington, D.C. p.6
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transportation of air cargo may be seen by the following
release based upon information submitted by the carriers
and showing their anticipated volume for the year 1948:
"Boasting a sixfold growth in the last
two years with gross of $17,000,000 for
100,000,000 ton-miles, in 1948, the cargo
carriers expect a banner year. In Novem-
ber, 1945, sixteen trunk lines flew
201,000 ton-miles. In October, 1947, the
same lines flew 7,000,000 ton-miles. In
the first ten months of 1947, all cargo
lines flew 40,000,000 ton-miles as compared
to 27,500,000 ton-miles for the scheduled
lines. Total domestic cargo moved during
the last quarter of 1947 will be 15,000,000
ton-miles per month against 250,000 in Novem-
ber, 1945.
Independents gross fourteen cents per ton-
mile as against twenty-six for the scheduled
airlines, but the scheduled lines have cut to
twenty-two cents. In 1946, scheduled lines
flew 19,000,000 ton-miles and the all-cargo
lines, 47,000,000 ton-miles.
The independents charge that the scheduled
lines do not know their freight costs since
they are not segregated from passenger, air
mail, and express costs. The independents
also claim that the scheduled airlines are
losing on air freight and are using the air
mail subsidy to carry them.
In 1948 the scheduled lines will attempt to
take over the bulk of air freight. The sched-
uled airlines are working through Air Cargo
Inc. for the interchange of air cargo with
ground carriers. As of November 15, 1947,
contracts for pickup and delivery were in effect
at forty points with 589 trucks and 1008 em-
ployees." (1)
Slick Airways, in October, 1947, alone flew
2,519,871 ton-miles with an unprecendented load factor of
2,519,871 ton-miles with an unprecendented load factor of
1, Air Freight at Record Volume, Aviation Week, NcGraw-Hill
Publishing Co., N. Y., December 22, 1947
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91.2%. This showed a rise in ton-miles of 500,000 over the
previous month. (1) Slick Airways continued to carry over
2,000,000 ton-miles a month for the balance of the year to
become the first cargo carrier, either certificated or non-
certificated
,
to break the 2,000,000 ton-mile mark.
D. Service
From the beginning of air cargo operations by the
non-certificated air carriers in the last months of 1945 and
the first months of 1946, carriers specializing in the car-
riage of air cargo alone were forced to operate on a non-
scheduled cr contract carrier basis. On May 8, 1947, the
Civil Aeronautics Bosrd recognized the movement of air cargo
as a separate field by the issuance of new regulations.
These new regulations recognized the cargo carriers as common
carriers thus enabling the non-certificated air cargo car-
rier^, for the first time, to go out and solicit traffic and
to guarantee shippers scheduled service over established
routes. (2)
Despite the fact that the non-scheduled carriers
had begun to operate with the disadvantage of non-scheduled
service, they immediately gained dominance over the air
1. New Digest, Aviation Week, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.,
N. Y., November 17, 1947
2. The Development, Operation, and Regulation of the Non-
Scheduled Air Carrier, U. 3. Dept, of Commerce, '/ashington,
D. C., 1947, p .4
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cargo field and continued tuao control even though American
Airlines in 1944 was the first to enter the field. Because
of the war American Airlines was not able to give the field
sufficient attention. W hereas the non-certificated car-
riers, until Hay 8, 1947, had to be assured of enough cargo
from their contract shippers to justify a flight, the sched-
uled airlines were able to load cargo on their passenger
flights and thus distribute the cost of the load. Since Hay
1947, the cargo carriers have been able to schedule their
flights and therefore solicit traffic on a common carrier
basis with a good chance of obtaining adequate traffic flow
in both directions.
The all cargo carriers have, since the change in
regulations, tended to seek cargo loads of over one thousand
pounds. Before their designation as common cargo carriers,
this was virtually necessary to cover minimum costs for a
specific flight under a contract. Since Hay, 1947 the all-
cargo carriers have solicited large volume traffic because
their planes are equipped for the movement of large size
shipments. On the other hand, the scheduled airlines have
tended to move passenger, mail, express, and freight with
the same planes on the same flight. This has resulted in
some restriction of the weight of a shipment that may be
carried on a single flight of the certificated airlines. A
survey conducted by the United States Department of Commerce
showed that shipments under twenty-five pounds usually were
...
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sent by air express, between 25-299 pounds both by air ex-
press and air freight, between 300-1000 pounds by scheduled
air freight, and over 1000 pounds, the choice of non-sched-
uled air freight occurred most often. (1)
During the last months of 1947, the scheduled air-
lines were withdrawing obsolescent planes from their all in-
clusive mail, passenger, freight, and express service and
assigning them to the exclusive movement of freight, thus
hitting at one of the biggest advantages of the all cargo
carriers
.
E. Types of Cargo Carried
While the breakdown of the method of shipment by
the United States Department of Commerce gave the most fre-
quent method, it was by no means, a hard and fast rule.
Scheduled airlines are now going into the movement of bulk
cargo with the planes released from passenger service while
the all cargo lines are attempting to pick up smaller sized
shipments. 3 ome of the items that have been carried by the
cargo carriers range from machinery of great weight to racing
horses. One line flew snowballs packed in dry ice from Death
Valley to the deep south for a party, another carried porpoise
milk to keep some baby porpoises alive, a third line hauled
a 2800 year old mummy around for exhibition purposes. One
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, U. S. Dept, of
Commerce, National Air Cargo Survey, Y/ashington, D.C. 1947, p.7
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line flew race horses from Florida to California and then
flew the horses back to Florida within a single week. (1)
Cargo carried by the cargo lines falls into three
of the five main commodity categories established by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The five categories are:
agricultural products, animals and animal products, manu-
factures and miscellaneous, mineral and forest. Nothing
was carried in the mineral or forest classes, two largest
categories of surface transportation. Of the cargo carried,
78<j, of the goods belonged in the manufactures and miscella-
neous class. The vast majority of all shipments were made
either because of an emergency or because of the perishabi-
lity of the items. This is shown by a list of the most
popular items moved: cut flowers, machine parts, women’s
apparel, drugs, machines and machinery, jewelry, perish-
able fruits and vegetables, live baby chicks. (2)
Because the only non-certif icated carriers eligible
to receive letters as non-cert if icated cargo carriers are
those who had applications pending for certificates as of
Hay 8, 1947, the number of all cargo carriers is limited to
nineteen. Thus there is about the same number of certifi-
cated air carriers and non-certif icated cargo carriers. The
number of non-certificated cargo carriers is almost certain
1. Flying Horses, Air Transport, HcGraw-Hill Publishing Co.,
N. Y., October 1947
2. Ibid.
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to remain the same for the present because the Civil Aero-
nautics Board has shown no disposition to open the field to
others
.
While air cargo carriers still have a vast field
to conquer, their growth will be slower inasmuch as the
easy traffic has been "scooped” up. In the future, it will
be a selling job to secure traffic and not merely the offer-
ing of cargo services as it has been during the last two
years. The rate offered on a weight basis will probably re-
main the same for the immediate future until present planes
and other equipment are outmoded.
F. Growth of Air Cargo
The non-scheduled air carriers enjoyed a phenomenal
growth at the conclusion of World War II. Chief among the
reasons for the rapid growth and development were the follow-
ing
(a) Return of thousands of Air Force veterans with
the skill and "know-how" to handle multi-engine
planes
.
(b) The surplus disposal program of the government
which made available multi-engine planes to the
air transportation industry and the returning
veterans at a fraction of their construction costs
as compared to the scheduled airlines of the United
States
(c) The inability of the scheduled airlines 1
.V.
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personnel and equipment to handle the heavy-
passenger traffic that developed at the con-
clusion of the war as the result of airline
operations during the war.
(d) The lack of interest on the part of the
scheduled airlines during 1946 in air freight
as a source of revenue thereby allowing the non-
scheduled airlines to secure control of this new
field
.
(e) Availability of ample capital for financing
newly organized companies immediately after the
conclusion of the war. This was the result of
the release of capital from war industries and
of persons attempting to invest war profits.
(f) Demand of the public for a more flexible
type of freight service than that offered by the
certificated airlines who could only fly specific
routes on regular schedule and who, m many cases,
nad to trans-ship through shipments. Moreover,
many times, scheduled air carriers were unable to
move plane load shipments because of lack of
equipment and organization set-up. (1)
1. The Development, Operation, and Regulation of the Non-
Scheduled Air Carrier, U. 3. Dept, of Commerce, Washington,
D. C., 1947, p.l
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Ill Regulation of the Non -Cert ificated Cargo Carrier
A. Prewar
Before World War II and until the organization of
the Civil Aeronautics Authority in 1938, there had been little
attempt made to regulate air services other than those of the
scheduled airlines of the United States. (1) When the Civil
Aeronautics Authority was set up in 1938 to regulate all air
transportation and services in the United States, the non-
scheduled carriers were placed under it. However, the Civil
Aeronautics Authority immediately passed an order (Non-3ched-
uled Exemption Order of 1938-Section 292.1 of the Economic
Relations) exempting them from the economic regulations. The
non-scheduled air carriers were subject only to general flight
rules applying to the entire aviation field. No specific fly-
ing regulations were applied to the non-scheduled operators.
Generally they were allowed to do much as they desired with-
out any interference from the Civil Aeronautics Authority
so long as they maintained the regulations applying to general
flying safety. This policy was continued by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board when it took over the functions of the Civil
Aeronautics authority in 1940.
The principle reason for this exemption was that at
the time of its passage in 1938, non-scheduled air transporta-
1. The Development
,
Operation, and Regulation of the Non-Sched-
uled Air Carrier, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington, D. C.
1947, p .
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tion had little economic signigicance . Most of the operators
were engaged in aviation services only, interesting them-
selves in the sales and service of aircraft and equipment,
flight instruction, aerial pnotography, and rendering services
general to the operation of airports. As it was necessary
that the board devote its full time to the development of the
certificated airlines within the United States, it left the
non-scheduled air services more or less to their own devices.
B. Postwar
At the end of the war, because of the rapid growth
of air services which could not be classed as fixed base
operations, the Civil Aeronautics Board began to delve into
the non-scheduled air transportation picture. It launched
an inquiry to re-examine its responsibilities with respect
to the non-scheduled phases of air transportation. On May
17, 1945, the Civil Aeronautics Board took action against
Trans-Marine Airlines and Page Airways, both of New York,
to restrain their activities and to determine whether they
were air carriers under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
Moreover, if both of these airlines were air carriers under
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, could their services be
classified as scheduled? These two cases (1) along with a
third, Docket 1501 (Investigation of Non-3cheduled Air
1. Docket 1967, Trans-Marine Airlines and Docket 1896, Air-
ways, Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, D. C. May 17, 1946
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Services) form the basis of all regulation of non-cert ificated
air transportation. If the two firms were air carriers under
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and v;ere not operating a
non-scheduled (were operating a scheduled) air service, they
were subject to the Civil Aeronautics Act and by not having
obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity
for the service, such lines were flying in violation of the
economic regulations and might be ordered to desist. (1)
In the case of Trans-Marine Airlines, the respondent
was charged with offering scheduled air passenger service be-
tween New York City and Hyannis, Massachusetts during the
summer of 1945 without the certificate of public convenience
and necessity required for scheduled air carriers by the Civil
Aeronautics Board. It was shown by the Civil Aeronautics Board
that Trans-Marine Airlines advertised its flights in the New
York newspapers, that it maintained regular booking offices,
and that it had definate departure times for its flights both
from New York and Hyannis. (2)
In the Page Airways case, the Civil Aeronautics
Board declared that the airline was maintaining a scheduled
service to Miami, Florida from Rochester, New York. This
service was based on a contract with the Florida Shipbuilding
1. Civil Aeronautics Regulations-Economic Regulations, Sec. 292
2. Docket 1967, Trans-Marine Airlines Inc., Investigation of
Activities, CaB, Washington, D. C. May 17, 1946
..
-
' rA
.
.
t
.
,
. .
.
Corporation. This corporation had contracted with Page Air-
ways for twenty round trips between Florida and Rochester,
New York, but with the proviso that all seats not used by
the Florida Shipbuilding Corporation might be sold to the
public. The airline contended that it was not an air car-
rier under the meaning of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
inasmuch as it was a contract carrier and not a common carrier.
Page Airways maintained that the common carriers were the only
group under the jurisdiction of the Civil aeronautics Board. (1
On May 17, 1946, after a year’s deliberations, the
Civil Aeronautics Board announced its decision in the two
cases. It also decided a third case, in which they undertook
to describe what was meant by the term ”air carrier” and the
type of operators who were included under the term "non-sched-
uled air carrier”. Under the provisions of the act, the Civil
Aeronautics Board defined the term ”air Carrier” thus: ”air
carrier means any citizen of the United States who undertakes,
whether directly or indirectly, or by a lease or any other
arrangement to engage in air transportation.” (2) It defined
a scheduled air carrier as follows : ”the scheduled air carrier
operates pursuant to a scheme or plan and is held out as
such through course of conduct in maintaining reasonably
regular service, filing of tariffs, and of schedules, advertise-
1. Docket 1896, Page Airways, Investigation of Activities, CAB
Washington, D. C., May 17, 1946
2. Civil aeronautics x^ct of 1938, Section 1 (2)
\_
<
-L-.
•
.
.
v
merits, etc." (1) From this definition, the term non-scheduled
air carrier was said to include all who did not maintain a
scheduled service, hut participated in air transportation,
offering service for sale as a common carrier in any way.
G . Changes in Regulations
As a result of its decisions in the Trans-Marine
airlines Inc. docket, the Page Airways docket, and its defi-
nitions announced in Docket 150}. relating to non-scheduled air
services, the Civil Aeronautics Board amended its regulations
to require that non-scheduled operators register their names
and addresses, their proposed services, the number and type of
aircraft on hand and or order, mileage flown, and other general
facts relating to their operationo, but did not require periodic
reports as it did in the case of the scheduled air carriers. (2)
The Board also amended the Civil Air Regulations to bring the
non-scheduled air carriers more fully under the flight safety
regulations from which they had previously been almost exempt. (3)
The Board realized that it did not, at that time, have suffi-
cient factual data to make a final determination of regulatory
policy nd hoped, by the information supplied in the reports by
the non-scheduled air carriers, to gather enough data to for-
1. Docket 1501, Investigation of Ron-Scheduled Air Cervices,
CAB, Washington D.C., May 17, 1946
2. Civil aeronautics Board Economic Regulations, Section 292.1
Amendment 2, CAB, Washington D.C., June 15, 1946
3. Flight Regulations, Part 42, Civil Aeronautics Board, Washing-
ton D.C., August 1, 1946
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mul te permanent regulations for all non-scheduled sir services.
In January of 1947, the Civil Aeronautics Board fur-
ther tightened up on the safety _nd flight regulations by lay-
ing down specific rules for the maintenance of aircraft, limi-
tations on the pilot flying time, serviceability of equipment,
weather minimums, landing rules, etc., and generally brought
the non-scheduled air operators, especially those using multi-
engine equipment under the same safety regulations as pertained
to the scheduled air carriers. (1)
Finally on May 8, 1947, ex ctly two years after the
basic dockets involving non-scheduled air carriers were ini-
tiated and a year after the preliminary decision, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, after a lengthy investigation and the hear-
ing of oral arguments, revised its entire classification of
air carriers. The Board separated the carriers previously
known as non-scheduled into two new categories: (1) Non-
certificated irregular air carriers, and (2) Non-certificeted
cargo carriers. (2)
As in the early decisions, when the Civil Aeronautics
Authority had defined scheduled carriers and then classified
all who deviated from the pattern as non-scheduled so the
Board used much the same technique in the classification of
1. Flight Regulations, Fart 42, Amendment 1, Civil Aeronautics
Board, Washington D.C., January 15, 1947
2. Economic Regul tions, Section 292.1, Amendment 4, and Section
292.5, CAB, Washington D.C., May 8, 1947
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cargo carriers nd irregular ir carriers by defining non-
certificated cargo carriers as those engaged in interstate or
overseas transportation of property only on a regular or ir-
regular basis. These cargo carriers did not need certificates
to operate, but were issued letters confirming their status.
All non-scheduled operators who deviated from this definition
were placed in the non-certificated irregulr r air carrier
status. (1)
The additional section, 292.5 of the Economic Regula-
tions of the Civil aeronautics Act, established the all-cargo
carriers as a separate classification with the right to oper-
ate on a regular or irregular basis as they desired. This
was distinct from the other category (non-certificated irre-
gular air carriers) which could operate on a non-scheduled
basis only. The cargo carriers were not permitted to operate
internationally or to carry passengers. The only carriers
eligible to operate under this section were those who had
applications pending with the Civil Aeronautics Board at the
time that the regulation was issued requesting the right to
nrnke scheduled interstate or overseas flights for transporta-
tion of property only. (2) This authorization ’was temporary.
The cargo carriers could operate until sixty days after the
Civil Aeronautics Board made a final decision on their request
1. Economic Regulations, Section 292.1, Amendment 4, and Section
292.5, CAB, Washington, D. C., May 8, 1947
2. May 8, 1947
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for uermanent certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity for the operation of scheduled cargo routes.
For the privilege of operating without a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity, the cargo carriers
had to comply more fully with the economic provisions and
regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board including such
provisos as compliance with labor legislation, filing of tar-
iffs, rates and schedules, nd providing safe service, equip-
ment .nd facilities. They were required to file reports and
to maintain such records and accounts as might be ordered by
the Civil Aeronautics Board when regulations pertaining to
accounting procedure ere amended to apply to non-scheduled
cargo carriers. (1) Air cargo carriers were allowed some
flexibility as to their routes compared with the regular
scheduled airlines. Cargo carriers were allowed to schedule
flights to general areas rather than to specific points. In
a large area, such a ochedule would allow the cargo carriers
to land at an airport nearest the recipient of the cargo
that the carrier was hauling at the moment. (2)
To participate in air cargo transportation under
these revised regulations, the non-certificated cargo carriers
1. The Development, Operation, nd Regulation of the Non-Sched-
uled Air Carrier, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Yashington, D. C.
1947, p.5
2. Docket 801 et al, Air Freight Cases, CAB Washington, D. C.
March, 1S48
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had to apply to the Civil Aeronautics Board for a letter of
registration and no air carrier was permitted to operate
after August 10, 1947 without having filed for such an appli-
cation. Such letters of registration are non-tr .nsferable
,
and are issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board. (1)
D. Results of the Revised Regulations
The new regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
setting up two separate categories of non-cert ificated sir
carriers were exceedingly pleasing to the non-scheduled air
carriers ^ince the new regulations allowed the cargo carriers
to operate on a common carrier ba. is with scheduled service.
The all-cargo lines were enabled to compete with the scheduled
airlines for air freight on an e ual footing. The Board had
granted the cargo carriers the right to operate on - sched-
uled b_sis because it believed that the development of ; sepa-
rate category would be hampered if its efforts ere restricted
to the handling of freight on an irregular basis. (2) Until
the time that the Civil Aeronautics Board made a permanent
decision on each line's application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity, the cargo carriers were allowed to
operate for all intents and purposes the same as if they had
secured the certificates that they had requested.
The all cargo carriers hailed this change in the
1. Economic Regulation, Section 292.5, CAB Washington, D. C. 1947
2*. The Development, Operation and Regulation of the Non-Scheduled
Air Carrier, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, 7;ashington, D. C. 1947, p.5
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regulations as a means of preventing the organization of a
cargo monopoly by the certificated airlines of the country
who had begun to step up their attempt to gain control and
to force the freight carriers out of the air freight field.
Lloreover, the cargo carriers were able to operate over routes
which could not be handled economically by the scheduled air
services because of the fluctuating demand for cargo service.
This was so in many places where it was not financially feasi
ble to operate a regular daily or weekly flight, but where,
from time to time, a demand might exist for the movement of
air freight.
For the remainder of 1947, the cargo carriers
operating under Section 292.5 of the Economic Regulations of
the Civil Aeronautics Board were enabled to make substantial
gains in the air freight field. One air lines showed that
itscargo traffic increased twenty-two percent after it re-
ceived its temporary permit from the Civil .eronautics Board
on August 1, 1947. (1) Other leading non-certificated cargo
carriers also reported sizeable gains in their total tonnage.
Lines began to show a profit for the first time since their
organization. This was an outstanding feat inasmuch as the
all cargo lines received no air mail subsidy, a factor that
1. Slick Airway News, Slick Airways
,
San Antonio, Texas,.
January 19, 1948
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bulks large as a revenue source for the scheduled airlines.
The total tonnage of all the airlines increased greatly in
volume. Because the cargo carriers v/ere able to offer
scheduled service and thus plan their traffic, the unpreceden-
ted load factor of over ninety percent was obtained, a load
factor hard to eaual in any method of transporta fcion in the
United States in normal times. Moreover, because of this
high lo^d factor for the last part of the year, a load factor
of seventy percent was obtained for some of the lines for the
entire year. This was extremely high in view of the diffi-
culties under which the cargo carriers had been operating at
the beginning of the year. (1)
The all cargo carriers have continued to expand
their freight operations increasing their volume each succeeding
month. They have secured a more efficient rate of operation
with a better use of plane capacity and are moving toward
more profitable operations. Some of the independent cargo
carriers have already begun to operate profitably, but drastic
rate cutting is stopping many short of the promised land.
However insofar as legislation and regulatory policy are con-
cerned, the non-certificated cargo carriers could ask for
little more except that their temporary permits be made per-
manent. Now that the cargo carriers have been assured of a
legal existence, the regular airlines are fighting so fiercely
1. News Release, Slick Airways
,
San .ntonio, Texas, Jan. 15,
1948
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for volume freight tonnage that they are endangering the
corporate existence of the all cargo carriers. (1)
E. Examiners » Recommendations for Certification
During March 1948, the C B examiners processing the
requests of non-certificated cargo carriers for certificates
of public convenience and necessity, filed their recommenda-
tions with the Civil Aeronautics Board. (2) The examiners
recommended to the Board that five non-certificated cargo
carriers who were operating under temporary letters of regis-
tration be granted certific-tea for „ three ye~r period. The
five lines recommended for certific..te~ were Slick Airways,
U. S. Airlines, Flying Tiger Line^, California Eastern Air-
lines, and Willis Air Service. The examiners believed th_t
the certificates granted to the cargo carriers should be of
only three years duration so as to provide a trial period of
operation. At the end of the three year period, the record
of the cargo carriers would be reexamined and final determina-
tion of the worth of all cargo service would be made. The
examiners declared in their recommendations that it must be
realized that the division of air freight between two types
of carriers, cargo carriers and the regular airlines, might
not permit economical service by either classification of
carrier. However, the examiners threw their support to certi-
1. The Aviation Week, Aviation Week, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.
New York, September 22, 1947
2. Docket 801 et al, Air Freight Cases, C^B Washington, D.C.
March, 1948
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fication of the cargo curriers because they stated that they
believed that the public would benefit from such a service.
The examiners declared that there was enough freight traffic
to justify a separate type of carrier to handle it and
concentration of cargo in the hands of one group of carriers
would result in economies in operation, administration, and
customer control. The examiners felt that the cargo carriers
granted certificates should not be allowed to carry air mail
or to bid for air mail contracts. They took note of the fact
that by the issuance of certificates to the cargo operators,
the national defense would be aided by the maintenance of air
services. This would be in accordance with the directives of
U. S. Congress to the Civil Aeronautics Board for its basic
policy. (1)
In rebuttal of the passenger airlines* claims that
certification of a second group of carriers would injure the
regular airlines, the examiners stated that they had doubts
that reservation of the air cargo field for the present certi-
ficated airlines would give them any aid in their financial
difficulties. The certificated airlines in the greatest
financial trouble at the present time are the smaller lines.
Such lines have the shortest routes and therefore the cargo
potential is limited.
1. Docket 801 et al, Air Freight Cases, CAB, Washington, D.C.
March 1948
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The certificated airlines have maintained that they
could handle air freight cheaper than the cargo carriers be-
cause they can use planes and personnel on combination flights
of mail, passenger, express, and freight. The examiners de-
clared th t this contention was true only as reg rds small
shipments and limiting air freight to small shipments was
not in the public interest. They stated that the certifi-
cated airlines would require specialized planes, facilities,
and equipment to engage in large scale movement of air
freight. The use of such special equipment would make the
costs of the certificated carriers as high as those of the
cargo carriers.
The examiners divided the United States into five
areas and proposed that each cargo carrier be allowed to
operate between two or more of these areas. These areas were
the North-east, the Mid-West, the South, the Southwest, and
the Far West. They urged that all point to point applications
for certification be denied and that the general policy of the
Board as regards cargo carriers be the allocation of routes
on an area basis. The examiners said that the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board did not have the right to grant area to area routes
under the powers given them by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938. However, the Board did have the right to allocate routes
from a specific point to designated points. The examiners
recommended that the Civil Aeronautics Board use this power to
designate enough points on each route allocated that the result
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vould actually be area to ~rea service. Under this policy,
a cargo carrier operating to the Northeast ould have as many
as fifteen or twenty points at which to land. Such points
vould cover n area extending from Washington, D. G. to
Rockland, Maine. Twenty landing points in this rea would
include all of the major cities.
The examiners felt that service to the major points
in each area should be on a scheduled basis and that the ser-
vice to intermediate points should be on a flagstop basis.
They recommended that the minimum re uirement for a flagstop
should be at least one thousand pounds of freight.
These recommendations of the GAB examiners are
significant inasmuch as the Civil Aeronautics Board has been
rarely known to overrule the recommendations of its examiners. (1)
IV Re tes and Rate Policy
A. Rates
Before World War II, there was little effort made
to develop air express traffic because the airlines looked
on it primarily as a fill-in to their regular mail and passen-
ger business. The promotion of air express was left to the
Railway Express Agency, a subsidiary of the railroads. 3 uch
express as was carried was simply stacked between vacant seats
on the regular scheduled passenger flights. Rates were about
Washington, D.C.1. Docket 801 et al, ,ir Freight Gases, CAB,
March, 1S48
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sixty-three cents per ton-mile, twice that of rail express. (1)
However, few lines could handle a ton of freight or express on
a single trip unless the flight was not veil patronized.
The practicability of the movement of a large volume
of cargo by air was established during world ,'ar II. V/hen
American Airlines, in 1944, set up a division for the ex-
clusive handling of air cargo, the rate for air freight was
set at twenty-six cents per ton -mile. (2) This high rate
made it impractical for the air lines to attempt to sell air
freight on a rate basis alone. Therefore a sales staff had
to be set up and much missionary work had to be done to show
shippers the advantages inherent in air freight, and the
savings that might be made through speed and safe handling.
Because of the v;ar, American Airlines could do
little to expand this service. Upon the termination of hos-
tilities in 1945, a new group of operators with experience
gained during the war sprang up and began operations with
surplus c rgo planes. " rithin a year, air cargo developed
to such an extent that in 1946, over sixty-million ton-miles
of air freight and express divided between the independent and
the certificated air carriers were moved. This represented a
tremendous expansion in air cargo volume over 1945 and was
almost a clear gain over the 1944 volume.
1. Struggle for Air Cargoes, U. S. News, U. 3. News Pub. Co.,
Washington, D. C. October 10, 1947
2. Ibid.

When the air freight volume increased phenominally
,
the scheduled airlines as a group realized the potentialities
of this new type of service and immediately jumped in to try
to regain complete control of this segment of the air trans-
portation industry in vhich they had, at least temporarily,
lost control. By the beginning of 1947, competition had re-
duced the number of independent all cargo carriers to a relar
tively few; those who had a strong financial backing and sound
management. This group ahich had managed to dominate the
industry through its ability and drive, was able to cut the
rate to about eighteen cents. (1) The group had stabilized
its position on this rate and felt that it could realize a
profit without government backing such as the certificated
air lines received in the carriage of air mail.
In the last half of 1946, the independent all-cargo
carriers moved about 24,000,000 ton-miles whereas the sched-
uled airlines moved only about 11,300,000 ton-miles. (2)
The cargo carriers were handling more than tv;ice the volume of
the certificated airlines. To counteract this volume, the
regular airlines dropped their rates to twenty cents per ^on-
mile after one of the all cargo lines (Slick Airways) had
dropped its average rate to twelve and two-thirds cents per
1. War of the Air Freight Front, Newsweek, Weekly Publications,
Inc., Dayton, Ohio, October 6, 1947
2. Struggle for Air Cargoes, U. 3. News, U. S. News Publishing
Co., Washington, D. C., October 10, 1947
.*
. : OJC
i
'
tr. a
.
.
.
,
' vile
j
,
.
t
‘
,
<J
, «
•
"
.
e
....
ton-mile. This move by the scheduled airlines served to start
a rate war between the independents and the scheduled airlines
In October 1947, three regular airlines, American
Airlines, Capital Airlines, and United Airlines filed new
tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Board to bring their rates
down to twelve cents per ton-mile. This meant that American
or United would fly a thousand pounds across the continent
for $159.00 instead of the previous $250.00. To ward off
this new threat to its business, the independent air cargo
group through its spokesman, proposed that it be allowed to
bid for air mail contracts. It stated that it could carry
the air mail at eighteen cents per ton-mile in place of the
present forty-five cents which the scheduled airlines were
receiving or the dollar per ton-mile that they were request-
ing becau e of financial losses. The all-cargo lines felt
that they could carry the mail at the commercial rate and
make money while the scheduled air lines had to be subsidized
by the government.
In contrast to the tv/elve cents a mile rate at
which they wished to move freight, the regular airlines were
moving passengers at the equivalent rate of fifty cents per
ton-mile, and depending on the individual airline, air mail
anywhere from forty-five cents to five dollars per ton-
mile. (1)
1. War on the Air Freight Front, Newsweek, Weekly Publications
Dayton, Ohio, October 6, 1947
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The all-cargo lines felt that the passenger lines could offer the
low freight rate bee use of the money poured into their cof-
fers by the air mail subsidy. They felt that the movement of
air freight by the scheduled air lines was being financed by
the public through the government. In support of this conten-
tion the cargo lines demanded that the scheduled air lines set
up their accounts so that a clear record might be seen of the
costs of the regular airlines in hauling freight. The cargo
carriers contended if the passenger lines would separate their
subsidized mail operations from the air freight operations, and
operate the air freight without a subsidy, the independents
could compete with them. The regular airlines stated that such
accounting was impossible because of the difficulties of segre-
gating joint costs. (1)
To stop the impending rate war and to give all
parties concerned a chance to present their viewpoints as re-
garded the proposed rate schedule, the all-c-irgo lines requested
the Civil Aeronautics Board to suspend the new tariffs until
such time as there could be a public hearing before the Board.
The cargo lines believed that if such rates i ere allowed to go
into effect, it would mean the elimination of the all-cargo
lines. Although the Civil Aeronautics Board had previously
never intervened in a freight rate case, it did suspend the new
1. S. R. Smith, Rres. American Airlines, Testimony at Rate
Hearing, January, 1948
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tariffs until such times as a hearing could be held in the
first part of 1948. The primary reason for this intervention
in a freight rate case was because upon this tariff would de-
pend the survival of an entire segment of the air transporta-
tion industry. This segment not only seemed necessary to the
commercial interest of the country, but had consistently re-
ceived the backing of the armed forces as a necessary adjunct
in time of national emergency. (1) The decision concerning
the rate war now in progress will determine which branch of
air transportation will win control of the growing new in-
dustry and what turn the air freight boom will take in the
period ahead.
While under the terms of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board is directed to
promote "adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable rates without unfair or destructive
competitive practices" (2) the Civil Aeronautics Board has
never formulated or expressed a specific rate policy in re-
gard to air freight. While it possesses the authority to
suspend a rate tariff within thirty days after it ha* been
filed by an airline, until October 1947, the Board had never
acted in the case of freight rates or given any indication of
1. ue^ort of President’s Air Policy Committee
2. U. S. Civil .Aeronautics Act of 1938, Declaration of Policy
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its attitude toward rates if it had an attitude. hen it
intervened in the proposed tariffs in October, the Board
took its first move toward determining a future rate policy
toward air cargo, a policy that would in great degree deter-
mine the future of the air freight industry. liuch of the new
rate policy v.ill undoubtedly be formulated in the decisions
of the suspended tariffs and should be announced in 1948.
Under its directive to foster the grov/th of aviation, the
Board c n m ke the decision on three basic lines. It may
determine that the certificated air lines of the United States
must be preserved and strengthened to maintain a sound and
well knit airline system, or it may decide that a fleet of
all cargo planes operating under the same safety and much
the same economic regulations as the scheduled airlines is
essential to the future transportation needs and to the nation-
al defense policy of the country. It may arrive at a compro-
mise solution that would allocate the air freight field be-
tween the two types of carriers on some basis as type of traf-
fic, size of shipment, etc.
B. Re commenda t i on of Examiners Concerning Rates
In April 1948, the CAB examiners charged with the
determination of rate policy for air cargo filed a brief with
the Civil Aeronautics Board urging that a floor be placed under
air freight rates. In the brief, the examiners urged that the
minimum rate for all carriers, both the cargo carriers and the
certificated passenger lines, for air freight be sixteen cents
-.
'
‘
** •
’ i off !
P
-
<
• M
.
«
—
per ton-mile. The examiners based this figure on the cost
of operation of a DC-4 which they said was the "workhorse"
of the air cargo industry. They further recommended that
the rate drop to fourteen and one half cents per ton-mile
for shipments of over two thousand pounds and that the
rate drop to thirteen cents per ton-mile for all shipments
over sixteen thousand pounds. These recommended rates
were in contrast to deferred rates of Slick Airways of
eight and a half cents per ton-mile or of the Flying Tiger
Line with seven and a half cents per ton-mile.
In their brief, the examiners stated that the all-
cargo plane (usually the DC-4) was the backbone of the air
freight industry. The combination planes of the regular
certificated airlines carry a relatively small amount of
traffic. In view of thio domination, r^tes were set on the
basis of all Co.rgo operations becau.e the examiners found
this to be the only course consistent with the proper develop-
ment of air transportation and with the statutory st_nd_rds
of the Civil Aeronautics Board. (1)
The examiners found, at the present time, that the
non-certificated cargo carriers were being forced to raise
their rates because of increasing costs. However, the certi-
ficated airlines showed no tendency to increase their cargo
rates. The examiners felt that unless the certificated air-
1. Docket 2719, Consolidated Air Freight Tariff Agreement, CAB,
Washington, D. C. April, 1948
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lines raised their rates, the non-certificated cargo carriers
would be forced to the wall. The examiners found that delay-
in other cases pending before the Civil Aeronautics Board
was contributing to the financial troubles of the cargo car-
riers. These cases concerned the proposed exemption of the
freight forwarders from an exclusion order which would eli-
minate them from the field, and allowing the Railway Express
Agency to serve the non-certificated cargo carriers. (1)
The examiners found that both the regular airlines
and the cargo lines were carrying air freight below cost.
During the first nine months of 1947, the three largest
cargo carriers, Slick Airways, California -Eastern, and the
Flying Tiger Line carried freight at an average rate of
13.29 cents per ton-mile, while their expenses were 17.52
cents per ton-mile. For every ton-mile carried, these lines
sustained a loss of 4.23 cents. At the same time, the certi-
ficated airlines were also operating at a loss. The examiners
found that United Airlines lost two cents for every ton-mile
moved. The examiners believe that if present rates are al-
lowed to stand or lower rate schedules filed by the certifi-
cated airlines are allowed to go into effect, the non-certi-
ficated airlines will be doomed. This is not because the
regular airlines are doing a better job, but because they are
able to offer lower rates because of their air mail subsidy.
1. Docket 2719, Consolidated Air Freight Tariff Agreement,
CAB, Washington, D.C., April, 1948
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The examiners found tiv t despite the lower rates of the certi-
ficated airlines, the cargo carriers are carrying seventy
percent of the air freight moved and that the percentage is
growing.
The certificated airlines argued that they could
move freight cheaper because they could ship it in the un-
used space on passenger flights. The examiners found that
only 6 . 8% of the unused space available on passenger flights
was used for the shipment of air freight. Freight tended to
move at night and between Tuesday ^nd Friday whereas passen-
ger traffic moved in the daylight hours with a great deal of
it on the weekends. Moreover much of the freight was either
too large or too bulky to be carried on combination flights.
Also much of the air freight was to off line points requiring
either a special contract flight or transshipment on a sur-
face carrier. The examiners held that to base rates on the
cost of operation of combination planes w:ould hurt the develop-
ment of the air freight industry. They stated that an accept-
ance of this by-product theory would mean that costs have no
bearing on rates. Such an acceptance, they declared, would
lead to the economic absurdity that small shipments would
move more cheaply than large shipments.
In view of the fact that the Civil Aeronautics
Board seldom fails to accept the recommendation of its examiners,
this brief can well state the future policy of the CAB toward
“ 5i - S
.
*
-
.
J
.
.
the air freight industry. (1)
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1. Docket 2719, Consolidated airfreight Tariff greement
CAB, Washington, D. C., April, 1948
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V Volume and Sources of Traffic
A. Volume of Air Cargo
During the first half of 1946 when the rates for
air cargo were over forty-five cents per ton-mile, the inde-
pendents moved over 15,000,000 ton-miles of cargo while the
regular airlines moved only about 4,000,000 ton-miles of
cargo. During the second half of 1946 with lower rates of
about twenty-five cents per ton-mile, the independents moved
over 24,000,000 ton-miles while the scheduled air lines moved
less than 12,000,000 ton-miles. For the first half of 1947,
the regular scheduled air lines increased their volume by
little more than a million ton-miles of freight while the all
cargo carriers gained 4,500,000 ton-miles although the rate
hovered around the twenty-five cent per ton-mile mark. (1)
While the non-certificated airlines increased their
ton-mileage about 75^> in the twelve month period, July, 1946-
July, 1947, the regular passenger lines made an increase of
213^. However, this was not as great a gain as it might ap-
pear inasmuch as the scheduled airlines started with a much
smaller volume of traffic. The scheduled airlines concentrate
on the movement of smaller shipments of one hundred and fifty
pounds or less while the freight carriers go after shipments
of over a thousand pounds and do so on a narrow profit margin.
1. Struggle for Air Cargo, U. S. News, U.S. News Publishing Co.
Washington D.C., October 10, 1947
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The scheduled airlines are concentrating largely on the inter-
city freight business between Los Angeles, Chicago, St. Louis,
Detroit, New York and Philadelphia. Fifty-four percent of
all air cargo flown moves between New York and Los Angeles.
On these routes, rates have been cut as low as eleven per ton-
mile. (1)
As a result of the rapid cut in rates in a two year
period, the volume of traffic has increased and is still in-
creasing beyond expectations. Surveys show that at eighteen
cents per ton-mile, the air cargo volume has increased tenfold
in the past two years to a total of 80,000,000 ton-mile an-
nually. If the new rate schedules of about twelve cents per
mile are approved, it is estimated that volume will expand to
100,000,000 ton-miles annually in the immediate future. At a
ten cent rate, probably one third of the nation's fruits and
vegetables would be flown to market. This would mean an in-
crease of at least 100$ in the volume of air traffic. If it
is possible to cut rates to five cents per ton-mile, air freight
could compete directly with surface transportation, thus bring-
ing unlimited expansion of air transportation. Naturally, the
rates charged will depend ultimately on the efficiency of
equipment and of operation. (2)
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air Cargo
Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., 194-7, p. 51
2. Struggle For Air Cargo, U. S. News, U.S. News Publishing Co.,
Washington D.C.
,
October 10, 1947
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Perhaps the type of equipment is the most important of all the
factors. Engineers estimate the cost of carrying freight in
a single engine plane at about thirty cents per ton-mile,
while in a DC-3 (dual -engined) it costs approximately twenty
cents per ton-mile. With four engine equipment, it costs
about twelve cents per ton-mile while equipment in the stage
of development will bring the cost down to tencents or less. (1)
It is quite conceivable that rates might drop to five cents a
ton-mile in the not too distant future, inasmuch as freight
handling methods are still being developed, and it is generally
conceded throughout the aircraft industry that no efficient
cargo plane has yet been designed.
The future of the air freight Industry is one of
further expansion as rates are forced down by competition.
The development of more efficient aircraft will also aid in
cutting rates. The growing struggle for the control of this
new phase of air transportation is certain to produce more
casualties among the firms taking part. Already several hun-
dred cargo carriers have fallen by the wayside so that the
cargo carriers still operating represent the survival of the
fittest. At stake is a multi-million dollar industry. Ex-cab
head James Landis has stated that air freight "vistas are be-
yond the imagination". (2) Estimates set the potential gross
1. Struggle for Air Cargos, U. S. News, U.S. News Publishing Co.,
Washington D.C., October 10, 1947
2. War on the Air Freight Front, Newsweek, Weekly Publications,
Inc., Dayton, Ohio, October 6, 1947
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of air cargo in the near future at a billion tons at thirteen
cents per ton-mile or a total of 3130,000,000 compared to the
present 310,000,000. (1) For such a prize, the struggle will
be bitter. The scheduled airlines hold the upper hand finan-
cially, but the all cargo carriers are actually hauling the
larger amount of freight.
B. Sources of Air Cargo
The potential sources for air freight have almost
no limit. As the cargo lines grow and become better stabilized
financially and more efficient in cargo handling techniques,
and as new and more efficient operating equipment becomes
available, there can be little doubt that costs will drop con-
siderably below the present figure. As the costs drop, not
only will the businesses now established be able to ship by
air cargo, but new businesses will be created to take advantage
of the benefits such as speed and efficiency offered by the
airplane. A large source of cargo for the air freighter will
result from the nation-wide distribution of perishables as
cut flowers, fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats, etc.
Because of the absence in aircraft of the jolts that occur as
a result of stopping and starting of trains, and because of
the relatively fragile structure of the airplane as contrasted
with the freight car and the truck therefore requiring careful
1. War on the Air Freight Front, Newsweek, Weekly Publications,
Inc., Dayton, Ohio, October 6, 1947
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handling, sensitive instruments, scientific and medical equip-
ment, and delicate instruments as cameras, watches and clocks,
projectors, radios and electronic equipment, glassware, etc.
may be transported by air. Another source of traffic that is
almost certain to come to the air freight industry in the
future will be the movement of all first class mail that travels
over four hundred miles. At the present time, it is estimated
that this represents about one billion ton-miles. (1) When
such a change-over is made, there can be little doubt that
the mail will be carried on cargo planes inasmuch as the volume
of mail, in most cases, would prevent it being moved as part
of a mixed cargo of passengers, freight and express.
The all cargo carriers in filing their tariffs with
the Civil Aeronautics Board indicate that with certain rates,
they expect a volume of two billion ton-miles in 1950. This
volume will include the amount created by rapidity of air trans-
portation as well as that made by inroads upon traffic generally
handled by the surface carriers. By 1952, the cargo carriers
believe that they will be moving between five and six billion
ton-miles annually with rates below ten cents per ton-mile.
These rates will be directly competitive with ground transpor-
tation rates for all commodities feasible for air transporta-
tion. (2)
1. Richardson, L. B., The Outlook For Cargo Planes, Curtiss
Wriffht Corporation, New York, 194-7
2. Ibid
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Already air freight is cheaper to many points than
rail express. One airline (1) quotes the following rates per
hundred pounds: Boston to/from
Air Freight Rail Express
Chicago #5.70 #6.11
Cleveland 4.15 5.45
Detroit 4.60 5.78
With such rates an actuality and the real drop in costs yet to
come, the air freight business is set to boom. Who will get
the benefit of this boom depends greatly on the decisions of
the Civil Aeronautics Board regarding the new rate tariffs. If
the CAB suspends the new rate schedules submitted by the sche-
duled airlines for the present time, the independents will
manage to hold their volume of traffic and to wait out new
equipment which will enable them to compete with the certificated
airlines. If the CAB allows the new tariffs to be placed in
force, the cargo carriers state that they cannot survive six
months with their present equipment. This would leave the air
freight field entirely to the certificated air carriers. (2)
1. American Airlines
2. Earl F. Slick of Slick Airways before President's Air Policy
Committee, September, 194-7
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VI Problems Facing: The Non- Certificated Cargo Carrier
A. Problems Involved
Eefore the all cargo lines can do any great amount
of expansion, they must find the solution to many problems,
some of which the certificated air lines have already solved.
One of the problems that has been practically solved is that
of scheduled air service. Until May, 1947, no non-certificated
air carrier could offer scheduled service. The effect was a
failure to attract sufficient volume of traffic to make oper-
ations profitable. The possibilities of conducting an effective
advertising program to sell a new air service were limited when
the flights had to be irregular. Seme lines that were losing
money heavily decided to curtail operations until such time as
the Civil Aeronautics Board clarified the status of the non-
certificated air carriers. This was done in May, 1947 when the
CAB recognized the category of non-certif icated cargo carriers
and granted permission for scheduled operation. (1) However,
this permission is temporary and can be withdrawn v/ithin sixty
days after a final decision by the Civil Aeronautics Board on
the future status of non-certificated cargo service. As a
result, the all-cargo lines are still faced with the problem
that at any time they may lose their right to offer regular
scheduled service and that their investment and organization
might be worthless.
1. Economic Regulations, Section 292.5, CAB, Washington D.C.
May 8, 1947
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A second problem at the present time is the high
and increasing cost of operation. In many cases the all-
cargo carrier is placed at a disadvantage when his plane re-
quires emergency repairs at an airfield away from his home
base. While the plane may be immobilized for a long period of
time, the carrier must fly his parts and personnel to the field
thus tying up a second plane or he may be required to use such
repair facilities as are available, therefore incurring con-
siderable expense that might have been avoided if the repairs
could have been made at a home base. If the non-certif icated
cargo carriers should ever reach a point in their organization
where they maintain cross country flight and repair facilities
as the certificated airlines now do, a large part of this ex-
cessive cost will disappear, inasmuch as the planes will al-
ways be near a maintenance base.
A third problem facing the non-certificated cargo
carriers is the increasing competition. Not only are the
scheduled air lines giving more attention to the securing of
air freight, but the competition between the various non-certi-
ficated cargo carriers is increasing. Until the inaugural of
the all-cargo flights by the certificated air lines, the non-
certificated operators carried all the shipments that were too
heavy or too large to be handled on the combination freight and
passenger flights of the regular air lines. 'When the scheduled
air lines initiated all-cargo flights, the non-certif icated
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cargo carriers lost heavily because of the more favored posi-
tion of the scheduled carriers in the matter of public rela-
tions, financial dependability, and goodwill. Moreover, as
the scheduled airlines secured more eoxuipment, they were also
able to cut into the business of the non-certif icated freight
and passenger linew shich had enjoyed a considerable cargo
interchange with the all-cargo carriers. Whereas the non-certi
ficated irregular carriers would exchange freight with the
all-cargo lines, the certificated airlines would either ship
cargo exclusively on their own system or would interchange it
with some other certificated air carrier. In either case, the
all-cargo lines were excluded from participation.
A fourth problem facing the non-certificated cargo
carriers is that of unbalanced traffic flow. Lines making a
flight to some "off the main line" point are, in many cases,
unable to secure return loads. The same problem holds true in
the east-west traffic between New York and San Francisco. One
cargo line reported that in a two month period, sixty- two per-
cent of its traffic was westbound and thirty-eight percent was
eastbound. A freight forwarder reported that,
"Of the traffic, sixty percent by weight is
westbound and forty percent is eastbound. Of
the eastbound, seventy percent goes to New York,
and the remaining thirty percent to miscella-
neous destinations including Kansas City,
St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, and Florida points.
Of the westbound traffic, ten percent goes to
Los Angeles, and the remaining ninety percent
-,
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to San Francisco”. (1)
One of the biggest factors contributing to the
dominant westward flow is the heavy traffic in department
store merchandise. This traffic is especially heavy in women’s
style goods. An association of thirty-four western firms of
the department e.nd dry goods lines reported,
’’Movement is from east to west and consists main-
ly of dry goods such as nylon stockings, gloves,
dresses or style goods also such other items
as sterling silver, style glassware, or rush
items Non-scheduled air traffic is used al-
most entirely”. (2)
Another association of firms operating in California
and using non-certificated air cargo services reported,
"The goods shipped are principally style goods
in the apparel line with women's apparel pre-
dominating. These firms have not enough goods
available to be shipped out of Los Angeles by
air to make the use of the association' s faci-
lities worthwhile in this respect”. (3)
A freight forwarder with offices on both the east
and the west coast indicated that a good volume of various
types moves eastward:
’’The greatest volume of traffic handled was
between New York and Los Angeles. We have also
arranged for shipment of a considerable volume
of freight between Los Angeles and Chicago,
St. Louis, Dallas, Ft. Worth, and San Antonio.
A fair volume of the traffic moving out of
Los Angeles consists of garments, especially
1* Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air
Cargo Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., 194-7
P. 35
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
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sportswear manufactured locally. Women's
sportswear predominates, but some men's
clothing items have also been moved. In the
winter months, flowers constitute a con-
siderable volume of traffic from Los Angeles
to eastern cities perhaps thirty percent of
the eastbound traffic, in the last month and
a half (prior to February, 1947), was in this
category. After the middle of March or the
first of April, fresh vegetables such as
lettuce, broccoli, and spinach begin to move
eastward in substantial volume. Somewhat
later, melons constitute a considerable
volume of traffic. From time to time, the
firm has shipped eastward frozen foods as
well as many miscellaneous consumer durable
goods. More westbound traffic was available
than eastbound, but there was less variety.
Style goods of women's apparel accounted for
the great bulk of the traffic, perhaps as
much as ninety percent The remainder con-
sisted of miscellaneous items of industrial
parts, and accessories and consumer durable
goods". (1)
Before the recognition of scheduled cargo carrier
service by the Civil Aeronautics Board in May, 1947, many of
the non-certif icated services attempted to offset the west-
ward flow of freight by offering passenger service on the
eastbound flights. However, this was distinctly second class
service inasmuch as the seats were collapsable and the flights
non-scheduled. The non-scheduled carriers were able to
attract passengers by offering rates lower than the regular
scheduled air lines. During 1946, most of the non-scheduled
lines resorted to this practice in order to balance their
traffic
.
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air
Cargo Survey, U.5. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., 1947
P. 35
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Another route on which the greater part of the
traffic flow is in one direction is that between the United
states and Alaska. Air cargo traffic on this route is mainly
northbound, but because of the low rates that prevail, two-
way traffic is necessary to make flight operations profitable.
Because of this reason, the whole development of freight oper-
ations on this route have been retarded. Until the recog-
nition of the all-cargo lines in 1947, the non-certif icated
carriers were able to cut their expenses in much the same way
as the operators on the trans-continental routes by hauling
passengers at a low rate on the southbound flights. While
non-scheduled irregular air carriers were still able to do
this, the all-cargo carriers have, in many cases, been forced
to abandon their services because of their inability to obtain
return flight loads. A good example of unprofitable service
due to inability to obtain return loads is the experience of
a line flying lobsters from small Maine towns to Pittsburgh
and Chicago. While the westbound traffic was profitable, the
operators were unable to secure goods for return loads and had
to discontinue flights. (1)
A final problem that the non-certificated cargo
carriers face is that of technical problems associated with
the development of a new method of transportation. Among these
technical problems are (1) the improvement of storage methods
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air Cargo
Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., p. 36
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and equipment for loading and unloading cargo; (2) develop-
ment of methods of soliciting traffic; (3) the installation
of temperature controls in planes for the handling of perish-
ables; (4) the furnishing of warehousing, precooling, and
other handling facilities at airports; (5) the provision of
suitable arrangements with connecting surface carriers; (6) the
establishment of common maintenance facilities with other
lines; (7) the establishment of adequate arrangements for
servicing, refueling, and repairing planes at Intermediate or
off-line points. (1)
Some of these problems were solved either completely
or partially when the non-scheduled cargo carriers were allowed
to operate scheduled flights and thus plan their traffic. Con-
cerning others, such as the increasing costs of operation, the
non-scheduled operators can do little. The balancing of traffic
flow can only be done through much missionary salesmanship.
New products or new markets may have to be developed. Solution
of the technical problems is the furthest advanced. Many air-
ports have already set up storage and refrigerator facilities.
Some airports are now specializing in the movement of air cargo
exclusively. (2) Common maintenance facilities have been
established at many airports for the maintenance of commercial
aircraft. Traffic solicitation, in many cases, has been placed
in the hands of freight forwarders while some of the larger
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air Cargo
Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., 1$47, p. 3o
2. Tetersboro, New Jersey
..S
firms are setting up their own sales organizations. Coordi
nation of freight facilities with surface carriers has al-
ready been achieved in many instances.
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VII Advantages and Disadvantages of Air Gar^o
A. Advantages of Air Cargo to Shippers
Surveys conducted by the Department of Commerce,
bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce show that among the
advantages of air freight to business, speed of service tames
first place. The most frequently reported benefit of speed
was that it kept production lines in operation or that it
broke production bottlenecks due to a scarcity of materials.
This was true in the manufacturing, construction, and the ser-
vice industries. Another benefit of speed was the saving of
time in the shipment of perishables. Fruits could be shipped
vine ripened from the West Coast for sale in the New York and
other eastern markets whereas produce that was shipped by
train had to be picked green ana ripened on the way to the
East Coast markets. A third benefit of speed was in emergen-
cy replacements of consumers' goods where demand had exceeded
expectations of the merchant. This was particularly notice-
able in the case of women's style goods. Retailers on the
West Coast used air freight for the replacement of stocks
quite often. The final benefit of speed was in the delivery
of medical supplies to stricken areas. This was emphasized by
a threatened smallpox epidemic in Seattle, Washington. Four
thousand pounds of smallpox vaccine were manufactured and
shipped to Seattle from the East Coast within forty-eight hours. (1)
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air Cargo
Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., 194-7, p. 65
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A second advantage of air freight was the economy
of service in many instances. In many cases, it was cheaper
to ship by air than by rail express. Air cargo rates have
continued to drop. There were and are a great savings in the
packaging costs of air cargo. Florists shipping flowers by
air save both on packaging and icing. A firm shipping electric
motors from Ohio to New England saves a considerable amount of
money because no packaging is required. An aircraft manufactu-
rer on the West Coast estimated that he saves crating weight
of about sixty-five pounds on the average crate. Not only
do firms save expense and labor on the crating of goods, but
they also save in the decrease in the shipping weight of the
crate. There may also be a saving due to the fluctuation in
the price of high value commodities. In many cases, New York
buyers of high priced furs for firms in the Middle West have
the furs flown from New York because of the wide fluctuations
in price. (Sometimes prices fluctuate as much as fifteen to
twenty percent in a day.) (1) Savings are made in the reduc-
tion of inventories inasmuch as goods sold can be replaced
overnight. Another benefit is the reduction of warehousing
costs where, in many cases, goods would have to be held until
an entire shipment had been assembled, but which can be accom-
plished in a much shorter time with air cargo.
A third advantage of air freight as shown by the
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air Cargo
Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., 194-7, p. 72
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cargo survey was the reliability of service. This reliability
of service refers to dependability of the service as well as
the care that is taken in the handling of shipments to avoid
loss or damage. Air freight services function in most cases
unhindered by strikes, lockouts, embargoes, etc. Purchasers
have more assurance that goods will arrive in better condition
than if surface transportation were used and that losses
through damage will be much lower than in the case of ground
transportation. Another reason given was the "less pilferage"
through shipment by air. (1)
Other advantages shown by the air cargo survey were
in shipments to Alaska. Air freight operated on a year round
basis while surface transportation suspended operations during
the winter because of ice. A jewelry company liked air trans-
portation because it could seal its packages with wax for
air shipment, but not for parcel post, and, in addition, air
cargo was more carefully handled than parcel post. Other com-
ments were that air cargo companies were courteous; that air
cargo built goodwill and repeat patronage, and that it enabled
firms to keep more accurate stock records. (2)
B. Disadvantages of Air Cargo Services
Among the disadvantages in air freight shown by the
survey were the delays in service. A principal complaint
against the scheduled airlines and to the benefit of the non-
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air Cargo
Survey, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington D.C., 194-7, P. 77
2. Ibid p. 80
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certificated cargo carriers was that shipments on the scheduled
carriers usually required trans-shipment and round-about
routing. Another cause of delay was the necessity of trans-
fers to surfa e carriers in cases where the destinations did
not have air service.
Again the development of air freight was hindered,
in many cases, by the lack of a pick-up and delivery service.
In many cases, the time gained through shipment by air was
lost while the shipment was awaiting delivery. One firm re-
ported that goods delivered to La G-uardia Field, New York were
not delivered to the firm in New York City until five to seven
days later. On shorter distances, shipments oy air held little
advantage because trucking firms offered door to door over-
night service whereas, in many cases, the airlines took much
longer. Finally, some firms attempting to make large bulk
shipments were held up for considerable periods of time be-
cause of the inability of the cargo carriers to furnish space.
A second disadvantage, many times, was the high cost
of service. Many firms, the survey showed, believe that rates
were much too high to make the use of air freight practical in
all cases. However, this disadvantage is rapidly being over-
come, and in some cases this complaint is already no longer
the truth. However, the cost of pick-up and delivery service
still makes the use of air freight excessive in a large number
of cases. This is especially true when the firm is a long
distance from the airport or when the airport is in an area
l3'
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without regular pick-up and delivery service.
A third disadvantage was the unreliability of
service principally due to bad weather. This was especially
so during the winter when several of the firms reported that
they intended to cut out the use of air freight entirely.
Again, one California firm complained about the inadequacy of
dispatching facilities. The firm was advised of the departure
time of its shipments in New York City, but never of any
delays, so, in several instances, had set up its organization
to take receipt of its freight which meanwhile had been
grounded someplace in the Kid-West. Again, firms said that
perishable cargoes were delivered by aircraft to the airport
of destination, but the person to whom they were shipped was
never notified. (1)
The fourth disadvantage was the inconvenience of
service. Many firms objected not to the cost, but to the lack
of pick-up and delivery service. As a result, firms had to
make their own arrangement to get shipments to and from the
airport. Others complained about having to pick up shipments
in the middle of the night or the early morning hours. A
final objection was the lack of coordination in billing and
accounting where goods were shipped over two lines, but parts
of the shipment were billed separately to the shipper by each
line
.
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air
Cargo Survey, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
,
194-7, P. 62
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Miscellaneous objections were to the lack of equip-
ment in terms of the number of flights each day and the lack
of service to many points. Firms that had built up a large
volume of business through air cargo during the slack period
of the freight lines were, in several instances, unable to
secure cargo space during the boom season. Other objections
included the inability to ship dangerous articles by air, in-
convenient location of airports, and the inadequacies of air
service as compared with other types of transportation. (1)
1. Industry Report, Domestic Transportation, National Air
Cargo Survey, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Washington, D. C.,
1947, p.86
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VIII Conclusion
A. Future Rates
The question of the type of carrier that shall
control the air freight field is directly up to the Civil
Aeronautics Board. Upon its rate decision in relation to
air freight will depend the nation's entire policy of air
freight in the future. The Civil Aeronautics Board in the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is directed "to encourage and
develop an air transportation system adapted to the present
and future needs of domestic and foreign commerce, the
postal service, and the national defense" and also "with
the duty of promoting adequate, economical, and efficient
transportation service by air carriers at reasonable rates." (1)
Under this directive, the Civil Aeronautics Board is empowered
to formulate the development of the future commercial air
policy of the nation. One of the instruments that the CAB
can use in making the policy effective is the manipulation
of freight rates of the various classifications of freight
handlers or of the individual airlines.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has three choices in
relation to the handling of the air freight problem. It can
continue to build up the certificated airlines as it has in
the past. This would be a "chosen instruments" policy with
the view that a small group of carriers aided by an air mail
subsidy would be best for the rendering of efficient, economical
1. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Declaration of Policy
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service to the shipper and the public. It may decide that
separate all-cargo carriers are to the future interest of
the country and so set its rate policy that the cargo lines
will be able to survive and develop even without financial
assistance by mail subsidies from the government. The Board’s
third choice may be the division of the air freight business
between the certificated airlines and the non-certificated
cargo carriers as allocating through routes to one group and
feeder routes to the other. It can allow full competition
between the two groups throughout the country by setting the
minimum rates of both groups high enough so that both types
of carriers can operate without the threat of financial inse-
curity .
The best interest of the country would not seem to
be furthered by a rate policy that would favor the scheduled
airlines as chosen instruments. The past war has shown the
value of the competitive airline system of this country over
the chosen instrument policy of other countries. The American
airlines were the only systems that made a sizeable contribu-
tion to the war effort in World War II. American airlines
flying in international commerce dominate such commerce al-
though airlines of other countries are supported outright by
their governments. If the Civil Aeronautics Board were to
adopt a rate policy that would tend to eliminate the non-
certificated cargo carrier from the air transportation picture
such action would serve to assure the scheduled airlines of a
..
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of a future bolstered up by the air mall subsidy. Competition
would be between the airlines now certificated with little
effort being made to divert traffic from one line to another
inasmuch as all would be assured of a comfortable existence.
The Civil Aeronautics Board may decide that the all-
cargo lines should have the entire air freight field and so
set its policy that the scheduled airlines would not be able
to compete. It could carry out this policy by keeping the
rates of the regular airlines high and allowing the cargo
carriers to set the cargo rates through competition, simply
assuring itself that the cargo rates are high enough to main-
tain adequate service. While such a policy would ensure com-
petition in the air freight field, it would eliminate from the
air cargo picture the ability and experience of the scheduled
airlines. The cargo lines would be forced to go through the
same stages of development as the scheduled airlines al-
though they would be able to bypass many of the errors be-
cause of the scheduled airlines' previous experience. However,
much experience would be lost to the field. Also, if the air
freight rates were set so as to favor the all-cargo lines,
the all-cargo lines could well develop into chosen instru-
ments rather than the certificated airlines. So far, a few
lines, better financed, have dominated the air freight field.
With their experience and with assurance of no competition
from the certificated airlines, these cargo carriers could
easily prevent any new line from entering the air freight
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field without strong financial backing. Moreover, such a
line would have to wage a long struggle for survival .. The
result would be two groups of airlines, the scheduled and
the all-cargo lines, would each dominate a portion of the
air transportation industry. Each would be certain that no
new competition would arise once the policy was set by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Both groups would be chosen instru-
ments in their alloted fields.
Finally, the Civil Aeronautics Board may decide on
some compromise of the two types. It could set air freight
rates high enough so as to eliminate cutthroat competition
and to make certain that all carriers received a fair return
upon investment. Such a policy would result in competition
being based on service and the speed of cargo handling, etc.
Thus, all carriers operating efficiently would be certain of
a profit, but there would also be certainty of competition.
No carrier or group of carriers would secure a position where
it could dominate the field. Each carrier would handle the
traffic that it could handle most efficiently. Such a policy
would definately assure of many competing carriers, without the
prospect of stagnation that might develop if only one group of
carriers were granted exclusive right to the cargo field.
Moreover, it is desirable in our system that each firm do the
job for which it is best fitted. The CAB's rate policy may
develop many competing airlines in the long run. However, it
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seems certain, at least at the present time, that the cargo
carriers will maintain their control of the air freight field.
This would he proper inasmuch as they are specialists in air
cargo. There would he enough competition from the scheduled
airlines to make certain that the cargo lines would not grow
fat and lazy on their share of the air freight business.
While the cargo lines were the specialists in the field,
they would he constantly being spurred on by the threatened
competition of the passenger lines.
The argument that the scheduled airlines have ad-
vanced against the all-cargo lines that "the scheduled air-
lines are losing money with the present volume of traffic
so that it would he foolish to further expand the industry",
is easily dispelled. Authorities of all agencies within the
air transportation field have predicted a tremendous expan-
sion within the next ten years, expansion that will enlarge
the field manyfold. This is a unanimous conclusion and has
been accepted by all. There is no reason then, why temporary
troubles of the certificated airlines in regard to their fin-
ances should be used to impede the progress of a large portion
of the air transportation field. The argument of the certi-
ficated carriers is one of using temporary difficulties to
halt permanent progress. Moreover, the Civil Aeronautics
Board examiners have held that certification or non-certifi-
cation of the cargo lines will have little effect upon the
certificated lines that are in the worst financial trouble.
.'
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The examiners stated that the lines in the worst financial
shape are the smaller lines with the shortest routes and
their cargo potential is limited. (1)
B. Future Size of the Air Freight Field
Estimates of the future size of the air freight
field vary widely, but all estimates are alike in that they
predict a tremendous expansion. One Authority (2) believes
that by 1950, we will be moving two billion ton-miles by air,
and by 1952, the total will be five billion ton-miles. He
feels that such a volume can only be handled by the use of
planes developed for cargo purposes exclusively. His outlook
is based on a need of 750 cargo planes of which two-thirds
will be of the trans-continental type (110,000 tons -120, 000
tons) and one-third, the intercity type (65,000 tons-70,000
tons). The planes will be designed for cargo, but would be
immediately convertible to military purposes if the need
should arise. In view of this fact, this authority proposes
that the government aid the cargo carrier by financial assis-
tance in purchasing planes. In return, the cargo carriers
would order planes that are easily adapted to military re-
quirements .
Another authority, Ex-Chairman of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, James Landis, does not give any estimate of the
1.
Docket 801, Air Freight Cases, CAB, Washington, D.C. March 1948
2. Richardson, L. B.
,
The Outlook for Cargo Planes, Curtiss 'Wright
Corporation, New York, 1946
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size of the future field, but simply states that air freight
"vistas are beyond the imagination". (1) In tne same ar-
ticle, estimates of the near future set the potential "take"
at sbout $130,GC0,0CG a year. This estimate does not take
into account the service that will be required by businesses
established as a result of the air freight industry. Other
authorities in the air transportation field agree that air
freight will, in the near future, grow as big as the passenger
traffic and may surpass it. The group that gains control of
the air freight industry is destined to have an eventful
future. The certificated airlines feel that they are entitled
to it because they were the pioneers in the air transportation
field or at least pioneers since the passage of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 when most of them were certificated.
The non-cert if icated cargo carriers would seize the field for
themselves on the basis that it is entirely a new development,
and as they were the principal force in its development, they
are entitled to first chance at it. Inasmuch as their success
depends upon its development, they would do more to develop
it than the certificated airlines which have other sources of
income
.
Suffice to say, the Civil Aeronautics Board in its
decision upon rate policy will determine who whall Control
the air freight field. The group that controls the air freight
1. Business War on the Air Freight Front, Newsweek, Weekly
Publication Inc., Dayton, Ohio, October 6, 1947
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field will be In on the ground floor of an industry that is
certain to flourish and to change many of the purchasing
habits of the American people. Such changes will be for the
betterment of the people and of the country.
.'
APPENDIX
292.1 IRREGULAR AIR HARRIERS
(a) Applicability
(b) Classification
(c) Exemption
(d) Registration for exemption
(e) Separability
( a ) Applicabi
l
i ty
This section s^aii not apply to any air carrier
authorized by a certificate of public convenience and necessi-
ty to engage in air transporta tion, to Alaskan air carriers
to operations within Alaska, or to any noncer tif i ca ted air
carrier engaged in air transportation pursuant to soecial or
individual exemption by the Board or pursuant to exemption
created by any other section of the Economic Regulations.
( b ) Classifica t ion
There is hereby established a classification of
noncer tifica ted air carriers to be designated as "Irregular
Air Carriers." An "Irregular Air Carrier" shall be defined
to mean any air carrier (1) which does not hold a certificate
of public convenience and necessity under Section 401 of the
Civil Aeronautics A.ct of 1938, as amended, (2) which directly
engages in interstate or overseas air transportation of
persons and property or foreign nir transportation of property
only, and (3) which doo3 not hold out to the public, expressly
or by a course of conduct, that it operates one or more air-
craft between designated points, or within a designated point,
regularly or with a reasonable degree of regularity, upon which
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aircraft it accepts for transportation, for compensation or
hire, such members of the public as apply therefor or such
property as the public offers. No air carrier shall be
deemed to be an Irregular Air Carrier unless the air trans-
portation services offered and performed by it are of such
infrequency as to preclude an implication of a uniform pattern
or normal consistency of operation between, or within, such
designated points. Within the meaning of this definition a
"point" shall mean any airport or place where aircraft may be
landed or taken off, including the area within a 25-raile
radius of such airport or place,
(c) Exemptions
(1) General. Except as otherwise provided in this
section. Irregular Air Carriers shall be exempt from all pro-
visions of Title IV of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as
amended, other than the following:
(i) Subsection 401 (1) (Compliance with Labor
Legislation)
;
(ii) Section 403 (Tariffs);
(iii) Subsection 404 (a) (Carrier* s Duty to
Provide Service, etc.), only insofar as said subsection re-
quires air carriers to provide safe service, equipment, and
facilities in connection with air transportation;
(lv) Subsection 404 (b) (Discrimination);
(v) Subsection 407 (a) (Piling of Reports);
provided, tnat no provision of any rule, regulation, terra, con-
dition, or limitation prescribed pursuant to 3aid subsection
407 (a) shall be applicable to Irregular Air Carriers unless
.'
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such rule, regulation, terra, condition, or limitation ex-
pressly 30 provides ;
(vi) Subsection 407 (b) (Disclosure of Stock
Ownership);
(vii) Subsection 407 (c) (Disclosure of Stock
Ownership by Officers or Directors)
;
(viii) Subsection 407 (d) (Form of Accounts)
:
provided, the t no provision of any rule, regulation, terra,
condition, or limitation prescribed pursuant to said subsection
40" (d) shall be applicable to Irregular Air Carriers unless
such rule regulation, term, condition, or limitation ex-
pressly so provides
;
(ix) Subsection 407 (e) (Inspection of
Accounts and Property)
;
(x) Section 403 (Consolidation, Merger, and
Acquisition of Control): provided, that Irregular Air Carriers
shall be exempt from section 4C3 insofar as said section would
make it unlawful, without prior approval by the Board, (a) for
any Irregular Air Carrier or any person controlling any such
carrier to purchase, lease, or contract to operate the proper-
ties, or any substantial part thereof, of another Irregular
Air Carrier, (b) for any Irregular Air Carrier to consolidate
or merge with another Irregular Air Carrier, and (c) for any
Irregular Air Carrier or any person controlling any such air
carrier to acquire control of another Irregular Air Carrier;
provided further, that any Irregular Air Carrier which con-
solidates or merges with another Irregular Air Carrier and
.,
.
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any Irregular Air Carrier or any person controlling any
such carrier that a quires control of, or purchases, leases,
or contracts to operate the properties, or any substantial
part thereof, of another Irregular Air Carrier pursuant to
the exemption granting herein, shall submit to the Board, not
more than 3C days following the consummation of the transaction,
a report indicating in reasonable detail the nature and result
of the transaction.
(xi) Subsection 409 (a) (Interlocking relation-
ships): provided, that if an application by any Irregular Air
Carrier for approval of an interlocking relationship in
existence on the effective date of this section is filed with
the Board prior to a date 30 days after the effective date of
this section, such air carrier may retain the officer, di-
rector. member, or s tockholder involved in such relationship
pending final disposition by the Board of said application:
Provided further that Irregular Air Carriers shall be exempt
from subsection 409 (a) insofar as said subsection would
make it unlawful, without prior approval by the Board, (a) for
any Irregular Air Carrier to have and retain an officer or
director who is an officer, director, or member, or who as a
stockholder holds a controlling interest, in another Irregular
Air Carrier, (b) for any Irregular Air Carrier, knowingly
and willfully, to have and retain an officer or director who
has a representative or nominee who represents such officer or
director as an officer, director, or member, or as a stock-
holder holding a controlling interest, in another Irregular
;
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Air Carrier;
(xii) Subsection 409 (b) (Profit from Transfer
of Securi ties )
;
(xiii) Section 410 (Loans and Financial Aid)
;
(xiv) Section 411 (Methods of Competition)
;
(xv) Section 412 (Pooling and Other Agreements) :
Provided, that Irregular Air Carriers snail be exempt from
Section 412 until 60 days after the effective date of this
section: provided further, that Irregular Air Carriers shall
bo exempt from section 412 insofar as said section would re-
quire any Irregular Air Carrier to file with the Board a copy
or a memorandum of certain contracts or agreements (other than
contracts or agreements for pooling or apportioning earnings,
losses, traffic, service or flying equipment), or of modi-
fications or cancellations thereof, between such carrier and
any other Irregular Air Carrier;
(xvi) Section 413 (Form of Control)
;
(xvii) Section 414 (Legal Restraints)
;
(xviii) Section 415 (Inquiry into Air Carrier
Management)
;
xiix) Section 41G (Classification and Exemption
of Carriers )
.
( 2 ) Additional exemptions for Irregular Air Carriers
utilizing small aircraft. Subdivisions (ii), (iv)
,
(vi), (vii),
(x), (xl), (xiii), and (xv) of subparagraph (1) of this para-
graph shall not apply to any Irregular Air Carrier which does
not utilize in its air transportation services any single air-
craft unit having an allowable ross take-off weight in excess
of 1C,00C pounds, or three or more aircraft units (not in-
cluding any aircraft unit having an allowable gross take-off
-.
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weight, of less than 6,000 pounds) having an aggregate allow-
able gross take-off .‘/eight in excess of 25,000 pounds.
(3) Additional tempora ;/ exemptions in foreign
air transportation. Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this section, Irregular Air Carriers for a period. of 3 months
after the effective date of this section, shall, with respect
to foreign air transportation of persons, be exempt from all
provisions of sections 401 (except subsection 4-01 (1) and
403 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193Q, as amended, only,
however to the extent that such foreign air transportation
of persons is confined to operations of the type exempted under
section 292.1 prior to this revision of such section.
(4) Approval of certain interlocking relationships.
To the extent that any officer or director of an Irregular Air
Carrier would, without prior approval by tae Board, be in
violation of any provision of subsection 4G9 (a) (3) of the
Civil 'eronautics Act of 1938, as amended, by reason of any-
interlocking relationship with another Irregular Air Carrier,
such relationship is hereby approved.
(5) Effect on other statutes. The exemption herein-
above granted from certain provisions and requirements of
sections 4C8
,
409, and 412 shall not constitute an order made
under such sections, within the meaning of section 414, and
shall not confer any immunity or relief from operation of the
"antitrust laws," or any other statute (except the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, as amended), with respect to any trans-
action, interlocking relationship cr agreement otherwise with-
-,
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in the purview of such section.
(5) Operational reports by Irregular Air Carriers.
On or before July 20, 1947, and thereafter on or before the
20th day of every October, January, April, and July, each
Irregular Air Carrier, except those Irregular Air Carriers
utilizing only small aircraft, as specified in subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph, shall file with the Board a quarterly
operational report covering the period of the three preceding
calendar months, showing all flights operated in air trans-
portation during such period, and stating, with respect to each
such flight, the dates of departures and arrivals and the
origin, destination, and intermediate points served. 7/hen-
ever any Irregular Air Carrier theretofore utilizing only
small aircraft, as specified in subparagraph (2) of this
paragraph, undertakes to utilize in its air ‘ ranspor tation
services any single aircraft unti having an allowable gross
take-off weight in excess of 10,000 pounds
,
or three or mo.^e
aircraft units (not including any aircraft unit having an
allowable gross take-off weight of less than 6,000 pounds)
having an aggregate allowable gross take-off weight in excess
of 25,000 pounds, such Irregular Air Carrier shall notify the
Board in writing within not more than 10 days after the actual
commencement of such utilization.
(d) Registration for exemption.
(1) Letter of registration required. From and after
60 days after the effective date of this section no Irregular
‘f a ( l« •: UN
-
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Air’ Carrier may engage in any form of air transpor ta tion un-
less there is then outstanding and in effect with respect to
such air carrier a Letter of Registration issued by the 3ca rd
provided, that if any Irregular Air Carrier, otherwise author
ized to engage in air transporta tion pursuant to this section
shall file with the Bo?rd within 60 days after the effective
date of this section an application for a Letter of Registra-
tion, such applicant has been notified that it appears to the
’"’card that such applicant is not entitled to the issuance of
such Letter.
(2) Issuance of letter of Regis tration. Upon the
filing of proper application therefor, the Board shall issue,
to any Irregular Air Carrier, a Letter of Registration which,
unless otherwise sooner rendered ineffective, shall expire
and be of no further force and effect, upon a finding by tne
Board that enforcement of the provisions of section 401 (fro’'-,
which exemption is provided in this section) would be in the
public interest and would no longer be an undue burden on
such Irregular Air Carrier or class of Irregular Air Carriers
Such application shall be certified to by a responsible offi-
cial of such carrier as being correct, and shall contain the
following information: (i) date; ( ii ) name of carrier; ( ii)
mailing address; (iv) location of principal operating base;
(v) if a corporation, the place of incorporation; the name
and citizenship of officers and directors and a statement
that at least 75 per centum of the voting interest is owned
or controlled by persons who are citizens of the United State
-.
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or of one of its possessions; (vi) if an individual or partner
ship, the name and citizenship of owners or partners; (vii)
the types and numbers of each type of aircraft utilized in air
transportation. Such application shall be submitted in dupli-
cate in letter form or on CAB Form No. 2739 which is available
on request for the convenience of applicants.
(3) Nontransferability of Letter of Registration. A
Letter of Registration shall be nontransferable and shall be
effective only with respect to the person named therein.
(4) Suspension of Letter of Regis tra tion . Letters
of Registration shall be subject to immediate suspension when,
in the opinion of the Board, such action is required in the
public interest..
(5) Revocation of Letter of Registration. Letters
of Registration shall be subject to revocation, after notice
and hearing, for knowing and willful violation of any provi-
sion of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, or of
any order, rule or regulation issued under any such provision,
or of any term, condition or limitation of any authority
issued under sal" Act or regulations.
(e ) Separabi li ty
If any provision of this section or the application
thereof to any air transpor tation
,
person, class of persons,
or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the section
and the application of such provisions to other air trans-
-.
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oortation, persons, classes of persons, or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby.
(58 Stat. 984 and 1004, as amended; 49 IJ.S.C. 425 and
496.) (Regs. Serial No. 388 ( 12 F . R. 3076))
Note : The record-keeping and reporting requirements
of t.nis section have been approved by the Bureau of
the Budget in accordance, v/ith the Federal Reports
Act of 1942.
„.
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APPENDIX - (continued)
292.5 NONCERTIFICATED CARGO CARRIERS
(a) Applicability.
(b) Classification.
(c) Scope of operations affected.
(d) Duration of exemption.
(e) Exemptions.
(f) Registration for exemption.
(g) Separability.
(a) Applicability
This section shall not apply to any air carrier
authorized by a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity to engage in air transportation, to Alaskan air carriers
to operations within Alaska, or to any noncertificated air
carrier engaged in air transportation pursuant to special or
individual exemption by the Board, or pursuant to exemption
created by any other section of the Economic Regulations.
(b) Classification
There is hereby established a classification of
noncertificated air carriers to be designated as "Noncerti-
ficated Cargo Carriers," A Noncertificated Cargo Carrier
shall be defined to mean any air carrier which directly
engages in interstate or overseas air transportation of
property only, and which on May 5, 1947
—
(1) did not hold a certificate of public conve-
nience and necessity under section 401 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, as amended,
(2) had on file with the Board an application for
a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing
scheduled interstate or overseas air transportation of proper'
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ty only, and
(3) was actively engaged in the business of car-
rying property by air for compensation or hire.
(c) Scope of operations affected
Except as otherwise provided in this section, each
Noncertificated Cargo Carrier shall be entitled to the exemp-
tions created by this section only with respect to transpor-
tation between such carrier's "established points." For the
purpose of this section, the term "established points" shall
be defined for any given Noncertificated Cargo Carrier to
include any point to or from which such carrier has trans-
ported property by air, for compensation or hire, on other
than merely a casual, occasional, or infrequent basis, at
any time during the 12-month period ending May 5, 194-7,
provided, however, that such point is a point, or is located
in a region, proposed to be served in such carrier's pending
application referred to in paragraph (b) of this section.
Upon filing written notice with the Board of intention to
serve any other point located with the area immediately ad-
jacent to any established point, such carrier also shall be
entitled to the exemptions created by this section, with res-
pect to transportation to or from such other point, unless
and until the board shall advise the carrier that such other
point is not deemed, with reference to the purposes of this
section, to be located within said immediately adjacent area,
or that said transportation to or from such other point is not
in the public interest.
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(d) Duration of exemption
Unless otherwise extended as to any particular
carrier by appropriate order of the Board, the exemptions
provided in this section shall apply to each Noncertificated
Cargo Carrier only until 60 days after the Board shall have
made final disposition of any one application, or part there-
of, on file with the Board by that carrier on May 5, 194-7,
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authori-
zing the direct scheduled interstate or overseas air transpor-
tation of property only.
(e) Exemptions
Except as otherwise provided in this section, Non-
cert if icated Cargo Carriers shall be exempt from all provi-
sions of Title IV of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as
amended, other than the following;
(1) Subsection 401 (1) (Compliance with Labor
Legislation)
;
(2) Section 403 (Tariffs);
(3) Subsection 404 (a) (Carrier's Duty to Provide
Service, ets.), only insofar as said subsection requires air
carriers to provide safe service, equipment, and facilities
in connection with air transportation, and to establish, ob-
serve and enforce just and reasonable individual and joint
rates, fares, and charges, and just, reasonable, and equita-
ble divisions thereof, and just, reasonable classifications,
rules, regulations, and practices relating to air transportation;
T *]'•'
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(4) Subsection 404 (b) (Discrimination);
(5) Subsection 407 (a) (Filing of Reports): Pro-
vided that no provision of any rule, regulation, term, con-
dition, or limitation prescribed pursuant to said subsection
407 (a) shall be applicable to Noncertificated Cargo Carriers
unless such rule, regulation, term, condition, or limitation
expressly so provides:
(6) Subsection 407 (b) (Disclosure of Stock Owner-
ship) »
(7) Subsection 407 (c) (Disclosure of Stock Owner-
ship by Of f icers -or Directors);
(8) Subsection 407 (d) (Form of Accounts): provided,
that no provision of any rule, regulation, term, condition,
or limitation prescribed pursuant to said subsection 407 (d)
shall be applicable to Noncertificated Cargo Carriers unless
such rule, regulation, term, condition, or limitation express-
ly so provides;
(9) Subsection 407 (e) (Inspection of Accounts
and Property)
;
(10) Section 408 (Consolidation, Merger, and Ac-
quisition of Control;
(11) Subsection 409 (a) (Interlocking Relationships);
(12) Subsection 409 (b) (Profit from Transfer of
Securities)
;
(13) Section 410 (Loans and Financial Aid);
(14) Section 411 (Methods of Competition);
(15) Section 412 (Pooling and Other Agreements):
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provided: that Noncertificated Cargo Carriers shall be exempt
from said section 412 until 60 days after the effective date
of this section: provided further, that such exemption from
said section 412 shall not constitute an order made under
said section, within the meaning of section 414, and shall
not confer any immunity or relief from operations of the
"antitrust" laws, or any other statute (except the Civil Ae-
ronautics Act of 1938, as amended) , with respect to any
contract or agreement otherwise within the purview of said
section 412;
(16) Section 413 (Form of Control);
(17) Section 414 (Legal Restraints);
(18) Section 413 (Inquiry into Air Carrier Manage-
ment) ;
(19) Section 416 (Classification and Exemption of
Carriers)
.
(f) Registration for exemption
(1) Letter of Registration required. From and after
60 days after the effective date of this section no Noncerti-
ficated Cargo Carrier may engage in any form of air transpor-
tation unless there is then outstanding and in effect with
respect to such air carrier a Letter of Registration issued
by the Board: provided, that if any Noncertificated Cargo
Carrier, otherwise authorized to engage in air transportation
pursuant to this section, shall file with the Board, within
60 days after the effective date of this section, an appll-
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cation for a Letter of Registration, such applicant may
engage in such air transportation until such Letter has been
issued or such applicant has been notified that it appears to
the Board that such applicant is not entitled to the issuance
of such Letter.
(2) Issuance of Letter of Registration. Upon the
filing, in duplicate, of proper application therefor, the
Board shall issue, to any Noncertificated Cargo Carrier, a
Letter of Registration which, unless otherwise sooner rend-
ered ineffective, shall expire and be of no further force
and effect, upon a finding by the Board that enforcement of
the providison of section 401 (from which exemption is pro-
vided in this section) would be in the public interest and
would no longer be an undue burden on such Noncertificated
Cargo Carrier or class of Noncertificated Cargo Carriers.
Such application shall be certified to by a responsible of-
ficial of such carrier as being correct, and shall contain
the following information:
(i) date;
(ii) name of carrier;
(iii) mailing address;
(iv) location of principal operating base;
(v) if a corporation, the place of incorporation,
the name and citizenship of officers and directors, the name
and address of each stockholder owning beneficially more than
5 per centum of the voting interest, and a statement that at
least 75 per centum of the voting interest is owned or con-
trolled by persons who are citizens of the United States or
'*
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of one of its possessions;
(vi) if an individual or partnership, the name
and citizenship of owners or partners;
(vii) reference, by date of filing and docket
number, to pending applications for certificates of public
convenience and necessity for interstate or overseas air
transportation of property only, filed with the Board prior
to May 5, 19z 7; and
(viii) list of the carrier’s established points,
as defined in paragraph (c) of this section, showing, as to
each such point, the maximum number of its flights serving
such point in any 1 month during the 12-month period ending
May 5, 1947
(3)
Nontransferability of Letter of Registration.
Letters of Registration shall be nontransferable and shall be
effective only with respect to the person named therein.
(4)
Suspension of Letter of Registration. Letters
of Registration shall be subject to immediate suspension
when, in the opinion of the Board, such action is required in
the public interest.
(5)
Revocation of Letter of Registration. Letters
of Registration shall be subject to revocation, after notice
and hearing, for knowing and willful violation of any provi-
sion of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended, or of
any such provision, or of any term, condition, or limitation
of any authority issued under said Act or regulations.
..
.
.
'
l
(g) Separability
If any provision of this section or the application
thereof to any air transportation, person, class of persons,
or circumstance is held Invalid, the remainder of the section
and the application of such provisions to other air trans-
portation, persons, classes of persons, or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.
(52 Stat.984 and 1004, as amended; 49 U. S. C. 425 and 496.)
(Regs. Serial No. 389 (12 F. F. 3079))
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